Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine by Winters, Diana R. H.
Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine
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Primary jurisdiction allows a court to refer an issue to an 
administrative agency for determination when the issue is within the 
agency’s purview, while still retaining jurisdiction over the case. At 
first, the doctrine seems like an elegant solution to a complicated 
problem, facilitating the interaction between courts and agencies 
confronting complex regulatory issues. But although the doctrine was 
developed within specific subject areas—rate-setting and labor 
disputes—where a failure to refer the issue would undermine the 
pertinent regulatory scheme, courts have expanded its use. The 
doctrine has become a tool that permits courts to stay or dismiss a 
case while seeking agency advice on a particular issue, without a 
finding that such a referral is necessary to forward the purpose of the 
regulatory scheme. The consequential delay has the potential to cause 
real harm to the interests of the litigants and to the regulatory scheme.
Courts should reconfine primary jurisdiction to the rate-setting and 
labor dispute contexts. If necessary to extend the doctrine to other 
areas where the consequence of not doing so would gravely injure the 
regulatory scheme, courts must recognize the value of an explicit 
articulation of the doctrine’s applicability and benefits. The 
consequences of the abandonment of primary jurisdiction in its 
“advice referral” manifestation will be slight because courts can 
utilize other mechanisms to encourage agency participation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Primary jurisdiction seems at first like an elegant solution to a complicated 
problem, facilitating the interaction between courts and agencies confronting 
complex regulatory issues. The doctrine allows a court to stay or dismiss 
without prejudice a case, over which a court has jurisdiction, while it “refers”
an issue “not within the conventional experience of judges”1 to the relevant 
agency. The parties can then return to court, administrative resolution of the 
regulatory issue in hand, for judicial resolution of any remaining issues in the 
case.2 Not only is the expertise of the agency captured,3 but the uniformity of 
the regulatory scheme remains intact.4 The reality, however, is not so tidy.
Although the doctrine developed within circumscribed subject areas, courts 
have applied it more generally, and this use has the potential to harm the 
interests of litigants, and the regulatory scheme.
Primary jurisdiction doctrine developed within two separate contexts: 
common carrier and public utility rate-setting,5 and within industrial relations 
and the National Labor Relations Board.6 The Supreme Court first used the 
doctrine in the context of rate-making by a common carrier, explaining that it 
would destroy the regulatory scheme to allow a court to determine a case 
based on the (un)reasonableness of a rate that had been filed with the Interstate 
                                                                                                                     
1 Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
2 Id. at 576–77 (holding that the United States had to bring its complaint for 
violations of the Sherman Act first before the Federal Maritime Board, but providing that 
an order of the Board will be subject to review by a circuit court, with the option of more 
review on a writ of certiorari).
3 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922) (holding that 
the determination of the reasonableness of a rate, rule, or practice is usually only found 
after “voluminous and conflicting evidence,” which requires experts).
4 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 439–41 (1907) 
(discussing how, without previous referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
regard to reasonable shipping rates, courts might reach different conclusions as to what is 
reasonable, and that a uniform standard of rates would be impossible).
5 See generally id.
6 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239 (1959). See
infra Part II.A for a discussion of the evolution of the doctrine.
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Commerce Commission before the Commission itself could determine that 
issue.7
In both the rate-setting and the labor dispute contexts, the Court found that 
referral of the regulatory issue to the relevant agency was necessary to fulfill 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the regulatory scheme, even though the 
requirement for referral was not expressly written into the governing statute.8
Judicial review in these cases (before agency review) would be “repugnant” to 
the respective statutes and would render them ineffective.9 This use of primary 
jurisdiction is well established and useful. As a mechanism to enact the 
intention of Congress, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is one of many 
doctrines that permit courts to decline or delay hearing cases for reasons of 
justiciability and comity, including ripeness, the political question doctrine, 
and the abstention doctrines.10
The doctrine has been expanded, however—not only outside of the rate-
setting and labor dispute contexts, but outside of situations where a failure to 
refer the issue would undermine the pertinent regulatory scheme.11 In other 
words, courts have adapted primary jurisdiction to “allow[] a court to refer an 
issue to an agency that knows more about the issue, even if the agency hasn’t
been given exclusive jurisdiction to resolve it.”12 The doctrine has become a 
tool that permits courts to stay or dismiss a case while seeking agency advice 
on a particular issue without a finding that such a referral is necessary to 
forward the purpose of the regulatory scheme.13 This use of primary 
jurisdiction causes harm, including delay, loss of state law benefits, and 
damage to the regulatory scheme,14 and should be abandoned. As this Article
is being written, a new administration focused on reducing the reach of federal 
regulation is about to take power,15 and it is likely that federal agencies, like 
the FDA, will have less resources available. For this reason, it is even more 
important that courts cease delaying cases to refer issues to these agencies for 
advice.
There has been surprisingly little analysis of the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine in scholarly literature. This is surprising because the relationship 
                                                                                                                     
7 Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 448.
8 See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240–43, 246; Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 436, 439.
9 Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 448.
10 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1433–34 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
11 See infra Part II.B.2.b.
12 Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001).
13 Id.
14 See infra Part III.
15 Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President, Unleashing America’s Prosperity to
Create Jobs and Increase Wages (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-
releases/unleashing-americamericas-prosperity-to-create-jobs-and-increase-wages [https://p
erma.cc/XSZ8-WH7A].
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between courts and agencies has been the subject of much recent attention.16
In this context, primary jurisdiction is occasionally noticed and mentioned as a 
mechanism with potential to improve court-agency dialogue, and one that 
merits further study.17 In 2014, Catherine Sharkey called the doctrine “a bit of 
an enigma in U.S. jurisprudence.”18 Some scholars have analyzed its use in 
specific circumstances,19 or have looked at specific aspects of the doctrine,20
but there have been few attempts21 to analyze its use by the Supreme Court 
and the lower courts.
This Article fills this gap by taking a close look at the doctrine and 
thoroughly examining its origins and use within the rate-setting and labor 
dispute contexts. This examination illustrates the distinction between primary 
jurisdiction as it is used in those areas—to preserve the regulatory scheme22—
                                                                                                                     
16 Catherine M. Sharkey has written extensively about this relationship, in numerous 
articles. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run Around 
the Administrative Process?, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2012) [hereinafter Sharkey, 
Preemption]; Catherine M. Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships in an Age of Preemption,
15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 359 (2014) [hereinafter Sharkey, Tort-Agency 
Partnerships]. For additional materials on the topic of court-agency relationships, see 
generally Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for 
Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (2014), which provides an overview of the 
ordinary remand rule. The ordinary remand rule is when a court finds that an agency’s
decision is erroneous and remands to the agency to reconsider the issue. Id. Finally, for a
discussion of the relationship between courts and agencies and the problem of serial 
litigation, see generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in 
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011).
17 See, e.g., Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships, supra note 16, at 383–85 (discussing 
reasons why primary jurisdiction may be useful to pursue tort-agency partnerships, but 
noting possible detriments to the doctrine’s use, including delay and agency capacity); 
Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary Jurisdiction 
Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning FDA-Approved Products, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1039, 1043–44 (2008) (discussing reasons why primary jurisdiction doctrine may be 
supported in Food and Drug Administration drug and device litigation).
18 Sharkey, Tort-Agency Partnerships, supra note 16, at 384.
19 See generally, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Anti-
Trust Laws., 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (1954); Struve, supra note 17 (analyzing the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine in the context of tort suits concerning FDA-approved drugs).
20 See generally, e.g., Nicholas A. Lucchetti, Note, One Hundred Years of the 
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: But What Standard of Review Is Appropriate For It?, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 849, 861–62 (2007) (describing the circuit split over the standard of review 
for primary jurisdiction rulings and arguing that federal courts of appeals should adopt a de 
novo standard); Bryson Santaguida, Comment, The Primary Jurisdiction Two-Step, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1517 (2007) (exploring the different standards of review for primary 
jurisdiction rulings and recommending an alternative, two-step standard of review).
21 In 2007, the Texas Law Review published an insightful note on the doctrine, which 
I have found very helpful. See generally Paula K. Knippa, Note, Primary Jurisdiction 
Doctrine and the Circumforaneous Litigant, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1289 (2007). 
22 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440–41 (1907) 
(holding that, if a court were to decide the reasonableness of shipping rates without 
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and primary jurisdiction in its purely advice-seeking manifestation.23 This
Article looks to the application of primary jurisdiction by the federal courts of 
appeals to investigate the consequences of its use, and to support the 
conclusion that, in its advice referral role, the harms of primary jurisdiction 
outweigh its benefits. The debate about the legitimacy of the abstention 
doctrine corresponds in some aspects to that about the legitimacy of primary 
jurisdiction, and is a useful analogy. This Article concludes with a call that 
courts abandon the use of primary jurisdiction as a tool to seek agency advice, 
and instead utilize other available mechanisms to garner the attention and 
participation of administrative agencies.24 The doctrine should be reconfined 
to its initial purpose—to the “core of the doctrine”25—and only be used in 
cases concerning rate-setting by common carriers or public utilities and labor 
dispute cases. In the alternative, and at the very least, courts granting primary 
jurisdiction referrals should utilize specific tools to insure the reduction of 
delay. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction, setting out its operation and tracing its history. This Part explains 
the difference between primary jurisdiction when used in situations of 
“exclusive agency jurisdiction,”26 and when used merely in an advice-seeking 
capacity. It examines the origins and evolution of the doctrine in the Supreme 
Court in the rate-setting and labor dispute contexts and in the other contexts 
where the Court has occasionally applied the doctrine. It also presents the tests 
the courts of appeals have developed to guide courts in the application of 
primary jurisdiction and looks specifically into two areas where lower courts 
have frequently utilized the doctrine: Medicaid review cases and food 
litigation cases.27 While the former context resembles the rate-setting cases 
where the Court developed the doctrine, the latter use of primary jurisdiction 
can be located squarely within the advice referral category of the doctrine.
In Part II, this Article sets forth the debate over the legitimacy of 
abstention as a helpful analogue to frame the discussion of the legitimacy of 
the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Here it becomes apparent that any discussion 
of the legitimacy of the doctrine must be intertwined with a discussion of the 
                                                                                                                     
previous action by the Interstate Commerce Commission, it would be inconsistent with the 
administrative power given to the Commission to ensure uniformity and equality of rates).
23 Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) (defining primary 
jurisdiction as allowing a court to refer an issue to an agency that knows more about it, 
even if the agency lacks exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the issue).
24 Christopher Walker has developed tools to enhance court–agency dialogue in the 
context of the remand rule that are useful here. See Walker, supra note 16, at 1613–14.
25 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563.
26 Id.
27 On food litigation and primary jurisdiction, see generally Diana R.H. Winters, 
Inappropriate Referral: The Use of Primary Jurisdiction in Food-Labeling Litigation, 41 
AM. J.L. & MED. 240 (2015), which discusses the adjudication of threshold doctrines such 
as preemption, primary jurisdiction, standing, and class certification in the context of food 
litigation. 
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consequences of the doctrine, which are discussed in Part III. That Part focuses 
on the delay brought about by the primary jurisdiction advice referral and the 
effects this delay has on the parties and the regulatory scheme. It also explores 
the purported benefits of the primary jurisdiction referral and explains why the 
harms outweigh the benefits.
Part IV presents the argument that primary jurisdiction should be confined 
to the rate-setting and labor dispute contexts. If courts extend the doctrine’s
use to like contexts, this should be done with an explicit articulation of the 
doctrine’s applicability and benefits. This Part explains that the consequences 
of the abandonment of the advice referral type of primary jurisdiction will be 
slight because of the availability of other mechanisms to encourage agency 
participation.
II. THE DOCTRINE AND ITS HISTORY
Primary jurisdiction was first used by the Supreme Court in the early 
twentieth century to coordinate the comprehensive regulatory regime for 
shipping rates with the nature of judicial review.28 The doctrine developed 
over the course of the twentieth century and was expanded to include public 
utility regulation29 in addition to common carrier regulation. It was also 
applied (in a slightly different format) in the context of labor disputes to 
negotiate the relationship between national labor laws with the state regulation 
of labor relationships.30 It is in these two contexts that the vast majority of 
Supreme Court primary jurisdiction jurisprudence is located, though the 
doctrine has been expanded by lower courts.31 In this Part, I discuss the 
doctrine’s operation and its history to support my argument that it is within 
these two contexts the doctrine should remain, under most circumstances.
                                                                                                                     
28 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 439–41 (1907).
29 Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining whether 
the plaintiff could have obtained relief against her telephone carrier under the Federal 
Communications Act only in a federal administrative proceeding, or if she could have 
obtained relief only through a judicial proceeding, or a combination of both).
30 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239 (1959) 
(determining whether the California Supreme Court had jurisdiction to award damages 
arising out of a union activity).
31 See, e.g., Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, 
at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s 
motion to dismiss second amended class action complaint and staying matter) (invoking 
primary jurisdiction to dismiss a food-labeling claim, referring it to the FDA for 
administrative determination, and staying the action for six months); Miller ex rel. Morrish 
v. Olszewski, No. 09-13683, 2009 WL 5201792, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2009)
(relying on primary jurisdiction to stay the proceedings in a Medicare and Medicaid 
dispute).
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A. What Is Primary Jurisdiction and When Is It Used?
Very basically, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides a mechanism 
for courts to refer an issue to an administrative agency for determination when 
the issue is within the agency’s purview while the case itself remains within 
the court’s jurisdiction.32 Definitions of the doctrine tend to emphasize judicial 
discretion, utilizing expansive Supreme Court language about primary 
jurisdiction. For example, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, the primary
jurisdiction doctrine is “[a] judicial doctrine whereby a court tends to favor 
allowing an agency an initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case in which
the court and the agency have concurrent jurisdiction.”33 The Second Circuit 
used this definition last year, and explained “[t]he doctrine is applicable where 
‘a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, but enforcement of the claim 
requires, or is materially aided by, the resolution of threshold issues, usually of 
a factual nature, which are placed within the special competence of the 
administrative body.’”34 The court’s description echoes a Supreme Court 
elucidation of the doctrine from 1956.35
These definitions communicate the basic notion that primary jurisdiction is 
about forum, not substantive law;36 it is about where an issue will be heard (a 
court or an agency). The application of the doctrine, however, is not always 
based on what “a court tends to favor.”37 Primary jurisdiction can be separated 
into two strains, as explained by Judge Posner.38 He calls the first type 
“exclusive agency jurisdiction,” and explains that this is the doctrine’s “central 
and original form.”39 This type is applicable when, during the course of a case,
an issue arises that is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of an 
administrative agency.40 “When such an issue arises, the suit must stop and the 
                                                                                                                     
32 Lucchetti, supra note 20, at 852–53.
33 Primary-Jurisdiction Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
34 Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kent Sch. Corp., 595 F. App’x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 58–59 (2d Cir. 
1994)).
35 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1956) (“‘Primary 
jurisdiction,’ . . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes 
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under 
a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative 
body . . . .”).
36 See, e.g., Knippa, supra note 21, at 1290 (“[T]he doctrine creates a jurisdictional 
right-of-way whereby courts are advised (or directed) to yield jurisdiction over matters 
before them to the respective agency whose authority has been invoked in the name of 
primary jurisdiction.”).
37 Primary-Jurisdiction Doctrine, supra note 33, at 1209.
38 Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[Primary jurisdiction] is 
really two doctrines.”).
39 Id.
40 Id.
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issue must be referred to the agency for resolution.”41 Once the agency has
resolved the issue, the case can then be resumed if need be.42 Judge Posner 
clarifies that “the court has jurisdiction of the case, but the agency of the 
issue.”43
The second incarnation of primary jurisdiction, which I call the “advice 
referral,” “allows a court to refer an issue to an agency that knows more about 
the issue, even if the agency hasn’t been given exclusive jurisdiction to resolve 
it.”44 Judge Posner compares this version of primary jurisdiction to Burford
abstention (a mechanism for federal courts to defer to state administrative 
procedures),45 and explains that these cases “are not felicitously described as 
cases of primary jurisdiction.”46 Here, the court is merely asking for an
agency’s advice before it determines the remainder of the case.47 This is the 
type of primary jurisdiction that falls within the definition used by the Second 
Circuit and Black’s Law Dictionary, although the doctrine originated as 
exclusive agency jurisdiction.
Both of these versions place original jurisdiction in the court and not the 
agency, thus distinguishing the doctrine from exhaustion.48 Although it sounds 
like exhaustion, and can sometimes, especially in exclusive agency jurisdiction 
cases, act like exhaustion, the doctrine differs from exhaustion because the 
claim at issue “is originally cognizable in the courts,” whereas “‘[e]xhaustion’
applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative 
agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process 
has run its course.”49 Moreover, in neither version is the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court implicated.50
                                                                                                                     
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 564.
44 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563.
45 Burford abstention was originally used in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 
332 (1943), and has been clarified by several subsequent decisions. In New Orleans Public 
Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989), the Court looked to the need 
to maintain uniform state procedures to justify Burford abstention, id. at 362–64, and 
limited it to use in suits for declaratory and injunctive relief in Quackenbush v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996).
46 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563.
47 Id. at 563–64. 
48 Ton Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 493 F.3d 1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is distinct from the concept of exhaustion, which prevents a 
federal court from exercising jurisdiction over a claim until all administrative remedies 
have been pursued.”).
49 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1956).
50 See, e.g., Ton Servs., 493 F.3d at 1238 (“Even where a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim, courts have discretion to refer an issue or issues to an 
administrative agency.”); Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 
775, 780 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Primary jurisdiction is not a doctrine that implicates the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Rather, it is a prudential doctrine under which 
courts may, under appropriate circumstances, determine that the initial decisionmaking 
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The two versions of primary jurisdiction are very different, though. In the 
first—exclusive agency jurisdiction—the court determines that it does not 
have the authority to determine the relevant issue and the case is therefore 
undeterminable without referral.51 We see this in the rate-setting cases where 
the doctrine was first formulated.52 In the second—the advice referral—the 
court can answer the question, but, for a variety of reasons, chooses to seek the 
aid of the agency.53 Some primary jurisdiction cases do not fall neatly into one 
category or the other and the court may invoke language from both types of 
primary jurisdiction to support an agency referral.54
As to the doctrine’s application, Justice Harlan wrote in 1956 that “[n]o 
fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine . . . . In every case the question 
is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether 
the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular 
litigation,”55 but this is not completely accurate. The application of the 
doctrine varies depending on the context in which it is being applied.56 In 
exclusive agency jurisdiction cases, like rate-setting and labor dispute cases—
both of which are discussed below—courts must refer certain issues to the 
relevant agency, while advice referrals are discretionary.57 Each circuit has 
formulated factors to guide courts in managing that discretion. For example, 
the First Circuit uses three factors: “(1) whether the agency determination lay 
at the heart of the task assigned the agency by Congress; (2) whether agency 
expertise was required to unravel intricate, technical facts; and (3) whether, 
though perhaps not determinative, the agency determination would materially 
aid the court,”58 and the Second Circuit uses four: (1) whether the issue is 
within the agency’s expertise, (2) whether the issue is within the agency’s
discretion, (3) whether there is a “substantial danger of inconsistent rulings,”
                                                                                                                     
responsibility should be performed by the relevant agency rather than the courts.”); 
Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 205 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(noting that where the federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, the
“question remains whether the district court should refer [the] claim to the [Surface 
Transportation Board] under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction”).
51 See Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563; Lucchetti, supra note 20, at 855.
52 See infra Part II.B.1.a.
53 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563–64. 
54 See, e.g., Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113, 114–15 (1973) (per 
curiam) (explaining that administrative adjudication of alleged violations of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and the rules were instrumental to the task assigned to the 
Commission, and adjudication by the Commission would be a “great help” to the deciding 
court (quoting Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 307 (1973))). Although this is 
clearly a primary jurisdiction case, and relies on a previous primary jurisdiction case for its 
ruling, the Court does not use the term “primary jurisdiction.” See generally Deaktor, 414 
U.S. 113.
55 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
56 See id. (“No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction.”).
57 Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 563–64. 
58 Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 580–81 (1st Cir. 1979).
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and (4) whether a prior application has been made to the agency.59 These 
factors tend to revolve around the rationales of expertise and uniformity, 
which were the values the Supreme Court looked to when initially formulating 
and applying the doctrine.60 Some circuits, like the Ninth, take the effect on 
judicial administration and the potential for delay into account when 
considering whether the use of the doctrine is appropriate.61
Courts vary on whether the primary jurisdiction doctrine is mandatory if 
the required factors are met but the disparity can be roughly explained by 
looking at the justification the court uses for referral—is it a case of exclusive 
agency jurisdiction or is the court seeking advice? The first will require an 
agency referral while the second is discretionary.62 For example, in a case 
regarding the rates that a telecommunications service provider charged several 
payphone service providers, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the interpretation of 
an agency order issued pursuant to the agency’s congressionally granted 
regulatory authority falls within the agency’s primary jurisdiction where the 
order reflects policy concerns or issues requiring uniform resolution.”63 The 
Court went on to find that in this case, “the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
requires referral of the threshold issue.”64 Rate-setting cases fall squarely 
within the exclusive agency jurisdiction prong of primary jurisdiction.65
Contrast this to Justice Breyer’s discussion of the issue, in a concurrence in a 
2003 case regarding the State of Maine’s prescription drug rebate program, 
where he explains that if the conditions for primary jurisdiction are satisfied, 
“[a] court may then stay its proceedings—for a limited time, if appropriate—to 
allow a party to initiate agency review.”66 Although cases like this one that 
involve Medicaid rates are hard to categorize and tend to fall in between the 
exclusive agency jurisdiction and agency referral prongs of primary 
                                                                                                                     
59 Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 93 Civ 3703 (KTD), 1994 
WL 116083, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1994)). The Ninth Circuit considers whether there is 
“(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within the 
jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute 
that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory scheme that (4) requires 
expertise or uniformity in administration.” Davel Commc’ns, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 460 F.3d 
1075, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 
1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
60 See, e.g., Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574–75 (1952).
61 See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2015).
62 I am only guessing that the cases would divide neatly along these lines, but did not 
catalog them as such.
63 Davel Commc’ns, 460 F.3d at 1089.
64 Id. (emphasis added).
65 See infra Part II.B.1.a.
66 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 674 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
concurring).
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jurisdiction,67 Justice Breyer would leave it to the discretion of the lower court 
to invoke primary jurisdiction and utilize available agency expertise.68
Other aspects of the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, like 
waiver and standard of review, vary across courts. For example, parties in the 
Seventh Circuit can waive or forfeit application of the doctrine because 
“primary jurisdiction is quite different from subject matter jurisdiction,” and 
does not “concern a court’s power to hear a case in the first instance.”69 But in 
the Eighth Circuit, “[i]t is well established . . . that [primary jurisdiction’s] 
invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it, ‘since the 
doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and 
administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties.’”70 There is 
also disagreement among circuits as to whether a determination that primary 
jurisdiction should be applied is subject to de novo review or abuse of 
discretion review.71
When a court decides that the application of primary jurisdiction is 
appropriate, it can stay the case until the issue is determined by the agency or 
dismiss the case without prejudice.72 Parties must usually approach the 
relevant agency themselves.73 The Ninth Circuit has stated, “There is no 
formal transfer mechanism between the courts and the agency; rather, upon 
invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the parties are responsible for 
initiating the appropriate proceedings before the agency.”74 In some 
circumstances, courts will stay a case for a specific amount of time while the 
parties seek resolution of the issue.75
                                                                                                                     
67 See infra notes 220–27 and accompanying text.
68 See infra notes 220–27 and accompanying text.
69 Gross Common Carrier, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 51 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 
1995) (cited in James W. Hilliard, Tapping Agency Expertise: The Doctrine of Primary 
Jurisdiction, 96 ILL. B.J. 256, 258 (2008)).
70 Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Barlow, 846 F.2d 474, 476 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Bos. Gas Co., 693 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir. 1982)) 
(also cited in Hilliard, supra note 69, at 259).
71 According to Bryson Santaguida and Nicholas A. Luchetti, the Second, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits use a de novo standard, and the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. 
Circuits use an abuse of discretion standard. Lucchetti, supra note 20, at 859–60; 
Santaguida, supra note 20, at 1533–34. The authors differ as to whether the First Circuit 
should be included in the de novo camp, and neither can place the Sixth nor the Eleventh 
Circuit. See Lucchetti, supra note 20, at 850–51; Santaguida, supra note 20, at 1533–34. 
72 See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1993).
73 See, e.g., id. at 268 n.3 (“‘Referral’ is sometimes loosely described as a process 
whereby a court refers an issue to an agency. But the ICA (like most statutes) contains no 
mechanism whereby a court can on its own authority demand or request a determination 
from the agency; that is left to the adversary system, the court merely staying its 
proceedings while the shipper files an administrative complaint . . . .” (citation omitted)).
74 Davel Commc’ns, Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 460 F.3d 1075, 1087 (2006) (quoting
Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 782 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002)).
75 See Hiser v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re St. Mary Hosp.), 125 B.R. 422, 427 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (suspending the proceeding for 120 days while parties appealed a 
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B. The Evolution of Primary Jurisdiction
Although Supreme Court rhetoric on primary jurisdiction has been 
expansive, invoking the proper relationship between agencies and courts and 
evoking a mechanism that can facilitate the purpose of the administrative state, 
the Court has applied the doctrine, for the most part, only in narrow 
circumstances. The rhetoric, though, invoking discretion and balancing, has 
contributed to the misapplication of the primary jurisdiction doctrine by lower 
courts.76 This Part discusses the development of the doctrine in the Supreme 
Court and surveys its application in lower courts.
1. The Supreme Court
In 1907, the Supreme Court prohibited a shipper of cotton seed from suing 
a railroad for charging an allegedly unreasonable rate.77 The Court explained 
that the shipper had to go first to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
which set the rates, to determine whether the rate was reasonable.78 This case, 
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., is often referred to as 
the origin of primary jurisdiction,79 and the parameters of the doctrine began 
to take shape through the first half of the twentieth century, mostly in the 
context of common carrier rate-setting cases.80
From 1956, when a case called United States v. Western Pacific Railroad
was decided, through April 2015, there were about seventy-three Supreme 
Court cases that considered whether the application of primary jurisdiction 
was warranted—whether a court should have postponed decision in a case 
while it referred an issue to an administrative agency.81 It is in Western 
                                                                                                                     
disallowance of Medicaid claims by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare), 
abrogated on other grounds by Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re 
Sacred Heart Hosp.), 204 B.R. 132, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
76 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 469 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Such dicta, 
when repeatedly used as the point of departure for analysis, have a regrettable tendency to 
acquire the practical status of legal rules.”).
77 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907).
78 Id.
79 See Jaffe, supra note 19, at 579; Knippa, supra note 21, at 1293; Santaguida, supra 
note 20, at 1519.
80 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b–.c.
81 This number, for the most part, only includes cases that actually include the words 
“primary jurisdiction.” I did include one case that was clearly a primary jurisdiction case 
but did not use the term. This case, Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 
113 (1973), where the district court should have referred actions against the commodity 
exchange to the Commodity Exchange Commission for an initial determination, id. at 115, 
is based on another primary jurisdiction case, Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 
U.S. 289 (1973), in which the term is used only by the dissenters. Id. at 310, 315, 317 n.6, 
319 n.7, 320–21 (Marshall, J., dissenting). I very well may have missed other cases where 
the doctrine is not named, but I feel confident that the majority of primary jurisdiction 
cases are in the common carrier and public utility rate-setting area and the labor dispute 
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Pacific, which is addressed below, that the Court coalesces the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction and explains the function of the doctrine.82 Courts83 and 
commentators84 often cite Western Pacific and Far East Conference, a 1952 
case,85 to explain the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Of the cases between 1956 and 2015 where primary jurisdiction was 
considered, the doctrine was accepted (agency referral approved) in about 40%
of the cases.86 Of the cases where the Court approved an agency referral, the 
subject matter was roughly divided as follows:
Table 1: Cases Where Agency Referral Was Approved
Number of 
Cases Subject Matter
15 Common carrier/public utility rate-setting and antitrust disputes
12 Labor disputes
2 Commodity exchange
1 Food and Drug Administration regulation
                                                                                                                     
context. There are also cases that include the words “primary jurisdiction” to indicate that a 
court or institution has jurisdiction in the first place, or to refer to a supporting case where a 
certain institution had jurisdiction in the first instance over an issue, but do not refer to the 
“primary jurisdiction doctrine” as discussed in this Article, and it is possible that I 
inadvertently included one or two of these in my count. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 486 (1987) (not mentioning the term, but the 
term is mentioned in cited authority, Pennsylvania’s Subsidence Act, 52 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.2 (West 2011)). The unpublished chart compiling collected cases 
is on file with the author.
82 See discussion infra pp. 559–62.
83 See, e.g., Tassy v. Brunswick Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 296 F.3d 65, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77–78 (D.D.C. 2011); United 
States v. Seibert, 403 F. Supp. 2d 904, 911–12 (S.D. Iowa 2005); Phone-Tel Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
84 See, e.g., Knippa, supra note 21, at 1295–300; Santaguida, supra note 20, at 1520–
24.
85 See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
86 See generally supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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In the cases where an agency referral was not approved, the subject matter 
looked like this:
Table 2: Cases Where Agency Referral Was Not Approved
Number of 
Cases Subject Matter
16 Common carrier/public utility rate-setting and antitrust disputes
18 Labor disputes
3 Bank regulation
2 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Health and Human Services) regulation
5 Other (Department of Agriculture, Commodity Exchange 
Commission, state employment issues, workers’
compensation issues, election issues)
These tables show that the vast majority of the primary jurisdiction cases 
that have reached Supreme Court review were in the contexts of common 
carrier and public utility rate-setting and labor disputes. In these areas, the 
question of whether an issue should be referred to the relevant agency falls 
into the exclusive agency jurisdiction category of primary jurisdiction, 
meaning that the court has determined that the case cannot go on until the 
agency has considered the issue.87 Theoretically, these cases differ from 
exhaustion cases in that they are properly before the court, though the issue at 
hand must be determined by the agency in the first instance.88 In practice, 
these cases are very similar to exhaustion cases because they must stop for the 
issue’s consideration by the agency, though there may be issues left over for 
the court to decide when the case returns.89
                                                                                                                     
87 See Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001); Lucchetti, supra note 
20, at 856.
88 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1956) (“‘Exhaustion’ 
applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; 
judicial interference is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. 
‘Primary jurisdiction,’ on the other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable in 
the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution 
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special 
competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended 
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.”).
89 Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1993) (“[A primary jurisdiction referral] 
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it has discretion either to retain jurisdiction or, if 
the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the case without prejudice.”).
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a. Rate-Setting Cases
Abilene Cotton first established the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the 
rate-setting context.90 The Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), passed in 1887, 
“made it the duty of carriers subject to its provisions to charge only just and 
reasonable rates.”91 The Act required “establishing and publishing schedules 
of such rates,” and “forbade all unjust preferences and discriminations, [and] 
made it unlawful to depart from the rates in the established schedules.”92 Rates 
of motor common carriers had to be filed with the ICC and the ICA 
“specifically prohibit[ed] a carrier from providing services at any rate other 
than the filed . . . rate.”93 It was the statute’s anti-discrimination focus that 
supported the uniformity and expertise rationales for primary jurisdiction; fair 
treatment for all shippers could only be guaranteed if one administrative body 
monitors rates.94
In Abilene Cotton, the railroad defended against the shipper’s charge on 
the basis that it had filed these rates with the ICC, and that the lower court 
could therefore not adjudicate the issue.95 Although this case is noted as the 
first primary jurisdiction case, and in primary jurisdiction cases we usually see 
jurisdiction retained in the courts, here the Court found that there was no 
jurisdiction in the court to hear the case.96 The Court explained that although 
                                                                                                                     
90 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907).
91 Id. at 437.
92 Id.
93 Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 120 (1990). This 
doctrine is called the filed rate doctrine and is strictly applied. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998). This is to “prevent carriers from 
intentionally ‘misquoting’ rates to shippers as a means of offering them rebates or 
discounts” because “the policy of nondiscriminatory rates is violated when similarly 
situated customers pay different rates for the same services.” Id. at 223 (quoting in part
Maislin, 497 U.S. at 127) (applying the filed rate doctrine in the telecommunications 
context and noting that relevant provisions in the Communications Act were modeled after 
similar provisions in the ICA).
94 See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 383 U.S. 576, 
591–92 (1966) (“If shippers could challenge the filed rates by proceedings before a court, 
without prior resort to the Commission, different conclusions might be reached by different 
courts; and the prevailing shippers would thereby obtain a rate preference as compared to 
unsuccessful shippers, which would violate the principle of uniform rates.”). All but two of 
the rate-setting primary jurisdiction cases since 1956 have to do with whether the ICC
should have the primary review of Interstate Commerce Act issues. The remaining two 
concerned the Shipping Act of 1916 and the Federal Maritime Board. These cases 
reference the same policy justifications as support of the use of primary jurisdiction in the 
ICC cases, and tend to cite the same precedent, including Abilene Cotton and Far East 
Conference. See, e.g., Port of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 68 (1970).
95 Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 430–31.
96 Id. at 448. This may be because this case only involved the specific issue that had 
to be referred to the agency; there was nothing left for the court to hear.
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there were two issues—whether the Act passed by Congress to regulate
commerce divested the lower court of jurisdiction, and whether, even if it had 
jurisdiction, the court could grant relief, based on an unreasonable rate, even if 
such rate had not been found unreasonable by the ICC—“these questions are 
only seemingly different, because they present but different phases of the 
fundamental question.”97 This question was whether a shipper could bring an 
action against a common carrier in court to recover damages based on the 
charging of an unreasonable rate even though the rate had properly been filed 
with the ICC.98
To determine that the lower court could not hear the claim, but that the 
“Interstate Commerce Commission . . . is vested with power originally to 
entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule,”99 the Court 
looked closely at the purpose and intended operation of the relevant Act.100
Even though the Act preserved common law remedies,101 the Court refused to 
construe that clause to allow for concurrent jurisdiction because “the act 
cannot be held to destroy itself.”102 The Court noted that one of the Act’s main 
goals was to establish uniform shipping rates,103 and that if courts as well as 
the Commission could hear rate disputes, “there might be a divergence 
between the action of the Commission and the decision of a court.”104 The 
Court here refused to allow courts to have jurisdiction over a rate filed with an 
administrative body, based on the uniformity concerns represented by the 
relevant statute.105
Over the next few decades, the Court continued to protect the authority of 
the Commission to determine rates and to grapple with the extent of its 
authority over tangential questions. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. 
Merchants Elevator Co., for example, the resolution of a disputed charge 
rested solely on whether the shipment fell within a tariff’s published rule or 
within an enumerated exception to that rule.106 The question for the Court, 
however, was whether this should be resolved by the ICC or a lower court.107
In deciding that the question could be decided by a court, the Court here noted 
that there was no need here for administrative discretion, and that because the 
issue could be appealed to the Supreme Court and this would satisfy 
uniformity concerns, there was no need for the ICC to determine the issue 
                                                                                                                     
97 Id. at 435–36.
98 Id. at 436.
99 Id. at 448.
100 Id. at 437–39.
101 Abilene Cotton, 204 U.S. at 439.
102 Id. at 446.
103 Id. at 439.
104 Id. at 439, 441.
105 Id. at 440–41. 
106 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 289 (1922).
107 Id. at 290.
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preliminarily.108 The Court concludes that “[p]reliminary resort to the 
Commission,” is necessary only in issues of “fact and of discretion in technical 
matters,” and when it is necessary for uniformity reasons.109
In United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., a 1932 case, the 
Court considered whether an antitrust challenge to a group of cargo ships 
could be heard in federal district court or was “within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States Shipping Board, under the Shipping Act of 
1916.”110 The Court explained that although the claim itself did state a cause 
of action under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Shipping Act may “stand[] in 
the way.”111 Analyzing other cases the Court had heard regarding the ICA,
like Abilene Cotton and Great Northern Railway Co., the Court concluded that 
the Shipping Act “should have like interpretation, application and effect,” to 
the ICA, and the important inquiry was whether the expertise of the ICC or the 
Shipping Board was needed to secure the uniformity that was the purpose of 
the ICA and the Shipping Act.112 Here, because the Shipping Act did cover the 
facts of the case, preliminary resort to the Board was necessary.113
The Court continued to affirm the primary jurisdiction of the ICC and the 
Shipping Board through the first half of the twentieth century.114 Abilene 
Cotton was cited for the proposition that a party challenging the 
reasonableness of railroad rates must first have this issue heard by the ICC: 
[T]his Court so construed the Interstate Commerce Act in the famous Abilene 
Cotton Oil case as to withdraw from the shipper the historic common law 
right to sue in the courts for charging unreasonable rates. It required resort to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission because not to do so would result in the 
impairment of the general purpose of that Act.115
                                                                                                                     
108 Id. at 290–91, 294.
109 Id. at 291.
110 U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 478–79 (1932).
111 Id. at 480. 
112 Id. at 481–85.
113 See id. at 483, 485. The Court explained that even though the ICA and the Shipping 
Act should be construed similarly, there was even a stronger case to refer shipping issues to 
the Board because the Shipping Act did not contain a savings clause for common law or 
statutory remedies as did the ICA. See id. at 485–86.
114 See, e.g., Gen. Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 428 
(1940) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction but should have stayed the case while 
the Commission decided the validity of a tariff practice).
115 Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 759 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Interstate Commerce 
Comm’n, 337 U.S. 426, 437 (1949) (“[I]t has been established doctrine . . . that a shipper 
cannot file a § 9 proceeding in a district court where his claim for damages necessarily 
involves a question of ‘reasonableness’ calling for exercise of the Commission’s primary 
jurisdiction.” (citing Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907))); Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 230 U.S. 247, 259, 266–67 (1913) 
(pointing to Abilene Cotton in finding that the court should stay the case so plaintiff could 
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The Court continued to clarify the boundaries of primary jurisdiction in 
the context of common carriers during the 1950s, and while these cases are 
firmly within the established tradition of providing the ICC and the Shipping
Board with exclusive jurisdiction over rate-setting issues, the rhetoric the 
Court uses in these cases is broad. In Far East Conference v. United States, the 
Court held that the United States had to bring its complaint for violations of 
the Sherman Act against an association of steamship companies before the 
Federal Maritime Board before it could be heard in federal court, as did the 
private shippers in Cunard.116 The Court elaborated that, “in cases raising 
issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases 
requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by 
Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over,” and that 
this principle was “now firmly established.”117 The Court discussed Abilene 
Cotton in depth, explaining that in that case, although “the face of the statute 
gave the Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts concurrent 
jurisdiction,” the Court had engaged in “one of those creative judicial labors 
whereby modern administrative law is being developed.”118 According to this 
philosophy, courts and agencies should work together to achieve the intended 
end of the relevant statute.119 Far East Conference relies on the language in 
United States v. Morgan, a 1939 case, to justify its conclusion that the federal 
government’s antitrust action had to be heard by the Federal Maritime Board 
before being brought in a district court.120 Morgan was not about which 
body—a court or an administrative agency—should hear a specific issue, but 
rather one about whether, and when, a court should distribute a fund it held 
pending a proceeding before the Secretary of Agriculture regarding the 
reasonableness of rates for services at the Kansas City stockyards.121 We see, 
in the Far East Conference Court’s reliance on Morgan, where the issue was 
whether a court, acting in equity, could discharge funds, a perception that 
primary jurisdiction is one tool among many available to facilitate the 
interaction between courts and agencies.
Abilene Cotton is a “creative judicial labor” in the sense that it found a 
mandate in “the act of Congress to regulate commerce,”122 that was not found 
in the language of the statute—that “a shipper seeking reparation predicated 
                                                                                                                     
appeal the reasonableness of rates to the ICC, and that plaintiff could return to the district 
court if plaintiff prevailed).
116 See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573–74 (1952).
117 Id. at 574.
118 Id. at 575. 
119 See id. (“Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the prescribed end, and 
so far as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words should be 
construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action.” (quoting United States v. 
Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939))).
120 Id. at 575–76.
121 Morgan, 307 U.S. at 185.
122 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 430 (1907).
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upon the unreasonableness of the established rate must, under the act to 
regulate commerce, primarily invoke redress through the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.”123 The Abilene Cotton Court acknowledged that if one read the 
relevant provision of the statute in isolation, referral to the Commission may 
not seem proper, but, “when the provision of that section is read in connection 
with the context of the act and in the light of the considerations which we have 
enumerated we think the broad construction contended for is not 
admissible.”124 The Court is reading the text of the statute within its context 
with a recognition of the congressional purpose behind the law.
Because the Act in question in Abilene Cotton did not explicitly withdraw 
a shipper’s common law right to challenge the reasonableness of rates in a 
court of law, doing so (as the court did) would be a “repeal[] by implication,”
which is not favored.125 The Court, therefore, explains that it can only justify 
its holding if the “preëxisting right is so repugnant to the statute that the 
survival of such right would in effect deprive the subsequent statute of its 
efficacy,” which it was here.126 The Abilene Cotton Court read referral 
requirements into the statutes that were not written, but found that the statutes’
anti-discriminatory purposes could only be effected through a policy of 
uniformity enforced by the implementing administrative agencies.127
Abilene Cotton’s holding was applied consistently through the following 
decades only in the same context—that of common carrier rate regulation. It 
was not a broad mandate to courts to negotiate the roles of agencies and 
courts.128 Far East Conference’s expansive rhetoric, though, when read 
independently of the facts of the case, permits courts to refer all cases 
containing “issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges,”
and within the purview of an administrative agency, to that agency instead of 
deciding the issue in the first instance.129
In United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., a 1956 case, several 
railroad companies sued the United States for the difference in the rate the 
government had paid for shipment of steel bomb cases and the rate the 
                                                                                                                     
123 Id. at 448.
124 Id. at 442.
125 Id. at 436–37. 
126 Id. at 437.
127 Id. at 436–40.
128 The dissent in Far East Conference argued that the majority, by finding the 
Shipping Act to vest primary jurisdiction over antitrust suits in the Federal Maritime 
Board, stretched its interpretive authority. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 
570, 577–79 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Shipping Act shielded shippers from 
unjust discrimination in rate-setting, but made no provision for the activity the Department 
of Justice was challenging here—an unlawful combination. See id. at 578. An antitrust 
challenge, as we see in Far East Conference, is profoundly different than a challenge to the 
reasonableness of rates, such as was seen in Abilene Cotton. Allowing the latter challenge 
to go forward in court would thwart the purpose of the relevant statute directly, whereas the 
same cannot be said—and was not said by the majority—for the former challenge.
129 See id. at 574–75 (majority opinion).
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railroads said that they were due.130 The Court of Claims adjudicated part of 
the claim—the construction of the tariff—but allocated the determination of 
the reasonableness of the claim to the ICC.131 The Supreme Court disagreed 
with this application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, holding “both the 
issues of tariff construction and the reasonableness of the tariff as applied were 
initially matters for the Commission’s determination.”132 The Court instructed 
lower courts to analyze whether the need for uniformity or agency expertise 
was present in deciding whether to apply the doctrine, explaining that these 
were the values supporting the doctrine.133 Uniformity and agency expertise 
“are part of the same principle,” which is “concerned with promoting proper 
relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with 
particular regulatory duties.”134 The Court cited Far East Conference’s
statement that it was “now firmly established” that agencies should have a part 
in determining “issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges 
or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion.”135
Since the primary jurisdiction doctrine was articulated in Abilene Cotton
in 1907, the Court maintained and negotiated the jurisdiction of the relevant 
administrative agency over the rate-setting (and connected activities) for 
common carriers and public utilities136 to protect the anti-discrimination 
purpose of the regulatory statutes.137 To protect the uniformity of rates, the 
                                                                                                                     
130 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 60 (1956).
131 Id. at 62–63.
132 Id. at 70.
133 Id. at 64 (“No fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
In every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are 
present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular 
litigation.”).
134 See id. at 63–64.
135 Id. at 64 (quoting Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952)).
136 See Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Public utility 
regulation and common carrier regulation (essentially the same form of regulation, the term 
‘common carrier’ being generally used of firms providing transportation or 
communications and ‘public utility’ of firms providing electricity or gas) have been rolled 
back very far in recent years. But a piece of it survives in its pristine form in the provision 
of long-distance telephone service. The terms and conditions of service are set forth in 
‘tariffs,’ which are essentially offers to sell on specified terms, filed with the FCC and 
subject to modification or disapproval by it. Once a tariff is filed and until it is amended, 
modified, superseded, or disapproved, the carrier may not deviate from its terms.”).
137 The regulatory regime has changed over the past century. For example, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) was passed in 1995, “which 
abolished the 108–year–old Interstate Commerce Commission and substantially 
deregulated the rail and motor carrier industries.” Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent. 
R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 197 (1st Cir. 2000). The Surface Transportation Board (STB) was 
established in the place of the ICC. Id. “The ICCTA creates exclusive federal regulatory 
jurisdiction and exclusive federal remedies” over others. Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 
F.3d 796, 804, 806–07 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the relevant provision of the ICCTA 
“completely preempts state laws (and remedies based on such laws) that directly attempt to 
manage or govern a railroad’s decisions in the economic realm”). The Supreme Court has 
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Court construed these agencies’ jurisdiction broadly,138 and parsed the 
availability of judicial review.139 Referral to the agency is not subject to 
judicial discretion if the issue falls within the agency’s rate-setting or 
construing authority; the Court has consistently stated that such a case must go 
first to the agency—which “alone is vested with power originally to entertain 
proceedings for the alteration of an established schedule”140—before judicial 
review of any remaining issues.141 The Court located the requirement for 
agency referral in the text, context, and purpose of the relevant statutes,142 but 
                                                                                                                     
not decided a case regarding the primary jurisdiction of the STB. Lower courts have used 
primary jurisdiction to refer cases to the STB. See infra note 206 and accompanying text, 
recognizing the ICCTA’s continuity with the ICA. See, e.g., Elam, 635 F.3d at 809 
(“[C]ourts have repeatedly applied the judicial doctrine of ‘primary jurisdiction’ in the 
context of both the ICCTA and its predecessor statute, the Interstate Commerce Act 
(ICA).”).
138 See, e.g., Burlington N., Inc. v. United States, 459 U.S. 131, 141 (1982) (“[U]nder 
the Interstate Commerce Act, primary jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of rates 
lies with the Commission . . . .”); S. Ry. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 
444, 460 (1979) (holding that the merits of a rate-change suspension decision by the ICC 
are unreviewable: “Judicial review would once again undermine the Commission’s primary 
jurisdiction by bringing the courts into the adjudication of the lawfulness of rates in 
advance of administrative consideration.”); United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 697–98 (1973); Arrow Transp. 
Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 668 (1963) (discussing the timing of rate changes under 
ICC’s exclusive primary jurisdiction: “Congress meant to foreclose a judicial power to 
interfere with the timing of rate changes which would be out of harmony with the 
uniformity of rate levels fostered by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.”); W. Pac. R.R. 
Co., 352 U.S. at 62–63 (questioning whether both construction and reasonableness of 
tariffs are within primary jurisdiction of the ICC); see also Cahnmann, 133 F.3d at 487
(noting that public utility regulation has been rolled back).
139 See, e.g., Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. at 446–47 (determining the 
reviewability of an ICC rate-change suspension decision); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. 
Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 383 U.S. 576, 592 (1966) (“Of course a preliminary determination 
by the Commission would have little effect in achieving uniformity if its determination 
were subject to de novo review . . . .”).
140 Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 448 (1907).
141 See also Burlington N., 459 U.S. at 138 (holding that federal courts must defer to 
the ICC “on questions concerning the applicable rates”); Arrow Transp. Co., 372 U.S. at 
667 (“[Congress] meant thereby to vest in the Commission the sole and exclusive power to 
suspend and to withdraw from the judiciary any pre-existing power to grant injunctive 
relief.”); W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 70 (“[T]he issues of tariff construction and the 
reasonableness of the tariff as applied were initially matters for the Commission’s
determination.”); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 576–77 (1952) 
(dismissing the government’s complaint and holding that “initial submission to the Federal 
Maritime Board is required”).
142 See, e.g., S. Ry. Co., 442 U.S. at 454 (“[T]he ultimate analysis is always one of 
Congress’ intent, and . . . ‘there is persuasive reason to believe that [nonreviewability] was 
the purpose of Congress.’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)); Arrow Transp. Co., 372 U.S. at 664–67.
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cushioned this within a more broad and generalized rhetoric about the 
interaction between courts and agencies.
Just as courts have been negotiating the parameters of the congressional 
delegation of supervision over certain aspects of regulation to an 
administrative body in rate-setting cases over the last century, there has been 
judicial attention on the interaction between courts and the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB), the administrative agency charged with the 
oversight over certain aspects of industrial relations since the passage of the 
National Labor Relations Act in 1935.143 This is the other main locus of 
primary jurisdiction activity.
b. Labor Disputes and the Garmon Doctrine
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) marked an enormous change in 
the oversight of labor relations, shifting the regulatory balance from the states 
to the federal government. In 1959, Justice Frankfurter wrote, “The 
comprehensive regulation of industrial relations by Congress, novel federal 
legislation twenty-five years ago but now an integral part of our economic life, 
inevitably gave rise to difficult problems of federal-state relations.”144 Courts 
were of course concerned with “determining the extent to which state 
regulation must yield to subordinating federal authority,”145 or when state law 
was preempted by federal law, but their purview extended to the appropriate
body before which disputes would be heard—courts or the NLRB. This is 
because:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be 
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It 
went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a 
specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular 
procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, 
including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress 
evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed 
procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive 
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety 
of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.146
In the context of labor disputes, therefore, courts must determine not just what 
law (federal or state) to apply to a labor dispute, but whether such a 
determination could even be properly made by a court, or should be made by 
the NLRB.
                                                                                                                     
143 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012)).
144 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239 (1959).
145 Id. at 241. 
146 Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
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San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon involved a dispute between 
several unions and a lumber business in California over whether the business 
should employ nonunion workers.147 The unions were picketing the lumber 
business, and the business brought an action in California state court asking 
for an injunction and damages, and simultaneously petitioned the NLRB for 
adjudication of the dispute.148 The NLRB declined jurisdiction and the 
California state court awarded an injunction and damages under state law.149
The Supreme Court had previously vacated the injunction,150 and the question 
before the Court here was whether the damages award could stand or was 
precluded by the NLRA.151
The Court held that even though the NLRB had declined jurisdiction, the 
State had no authority to act in the matter.152 The challenged activity 
“arguably” fell within the purview of sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA, and was 
therefore subject to “the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations 
Board.”153 Sections 7 and 8 are “broad provisions” that “govern both protected 
‘concerted activities’ and unfair labor practices. They regulate the vital, 
economic instruments of the strike and the picket line, and impinge on the 
clash of the still unsettled claims between employers and labor unions.”154
The Garmon Court supported this conclusion by pointing to Congress’s
intention that labor disputes be handled uniformly and the need for centralized 
expertise to ensure this uniformity.155 The NLRB’s primary jurisdiction over 
matters covered by sections 7 and 8 is crucial to the federal regulation of 
industrial relations, and its declination of the issue “does not give the States 
the power to act.”156 The activity here arguably fell within sections 7 or 8 of 
the NLRA, which displaced state jurisdiction.157 This was so even though the 
NLRB could not have awarded damages even had it accepted the case.158
In Garmon, the challenged activity was “arguably” protected by federal 
law.159 The Court explained in a later case that matters arguably protected by 
federal law fall under the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB for the purpose of 
ensuring uniformity of administration of the national labor relations laws.160
                                                                                                                     
147 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237.
148 Id. at 237–38.
149 Id. 
150 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957).
151 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 239.
152 Id. at 246.
153 Id. at 245.
154 Id. at 241.
155 See id. at 242–43.
156 Id. at 246.
157 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246.
158 Id.
159 See id. at 245.
160 Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 
502 (1984) (“[A] presumption of federal pre-emption applies even when the state law 
regulates conduct only arguably protected by federal law. Such a pre-emption rule avoids 
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This situation differs from when the activity is actually protected by federal 
law, in which case federal law preempts state law.161
The distinction between NLRB primary jurisdiction to protect the 
uniformity of the regulatory scheme and primary jurisdiction as a matter of 
preemption introduces an element of discretion into the primary jurisdiction 
deliberation. In the case where activity is actually protected, and federal law 
preempts state law, “pre-emption follows not as a matter of protecting primary 
jurisdiction, but as a matter of substantive right.”162 While Garmon provides 
that when “regulated conduct touche[s] interests so deeply rooted in local 
feeling and responsibility,” states may regulate “in the absence of compelling 
congressional direction,”163 this exception is not available when the matter is 
one of preemption.164
The primary jurisdiction of the NLRB differs slightly from what we see in 
the context of rate-setting activities by common carriers and public utilities in 
that jurisdiction does not return to the referring court after the issue has been 
litigated:
                                                                                                                     
the potential for jurisdictional conflict between state courts or agencies and the NLRB by 
ensuring that primary responsibility for interpreting and applying this body of labor law 
remains with the NLRB.”).
161 The Garmon doctrine is one of two NLRA preemption doctrines. The second 
“protects against state interference with policies implicated by the structure of the Act 
itself, by pre-empting state law and state causes of action concerning conduct that Congress 
intended to be unregulated.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749 
(1985). This doctrine expands the reach of exclusive federal jurisdiction over labor issues, 
but does not directly implicate the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. See Brown, 468 U.S. 
at 502–03 (“[P]resumption of federal pre-emption, based on the primary jurisdiction 
rationale, properly admits to exception when unusually ‘deeply rooted’ local interests are at 
stake.”).
162 Brown, 468 U.S. at 503.
163 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. The Court has grappled with the boundaries of this 
exception. The Court has, for example, determined that an employer could have a trespass 
action against a union heard by a state court, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cty. Dist. 
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 198 (1978); that a union member’s claim for 
wrongful expulsion was not within the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction, Int’l Bhd. of 
Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 237–38 (1971); that a defamation suit within the 
context of a labor dispute can be heard by a state court, Linn v. United Plant Guard 
Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966); and that the question of whether a marketing 
restriction is a condition of employment is not within the primary jurisdiction of the 
NLRB, Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
685–86 (1965).
164 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 214 n.9 (1985) (“So-called Garmon
pre-emption involves protecting the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB, and requires a 
balancing of state and federal interests. The present tort suit would allow the State to 
provide a rule of decision where Congress has mandated that federal law should govern. In 
this situation the balancing of state and federal interests required by Garmon pre-emption 
is irrelevant, since Congress, acting within its power under the Commerce Clause, has 
provided that federal law must prevail.”).
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[T]he term “primary jurisdiction” [in regards to industrial relations] is used to 
refer to the various considerations articulated in Garmon and its progeny that 
militate in favor of pre-empting state-court jurisdiction over activity which is 
subject to the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the federal Board. . . .
. . . .
. . . While the considerations underlying Garmon are similar to those 
underlying the primary-jurisdiction doctrine, the consequences of the two 
doctrines are therefore different. Where applicable, the Garmon doctrine 
completely pre-empts state-court jurisdiction unless the Board determines 
that the disputed conduct is neither protected nor prohibited by the federal 
Act.165
This theoretical distinction is not applied wholly consistently, however, as the 
Court describes, at other times, the Garmon doctrine by reference to the rate-
setting cases described above,166 including Western Pacific and Far East 
Conference.167
The Garmon doctrine protects the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB to 
consider certain aspects of labor disputes, and to determine whether or not it is 
federal or state law that should govern. Courts can balance state and federal 
interests in determining the appropriateness of primary jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances, and thus the NLRB’s jurisdiction cannot be categorized as 
exclusive agency jurisdiction. Courts, however, are not basing referral to the 
agency on whether they need advice about the issue at hand, as in the advice 
referral model of primary jurisdiction. The case will not return to the court 
after the agency determines the issue. Moreover, it is uniformity concerns that 
are paramount. As with rate-setting cases, the purpose and structure of the 
relevant statute requires adjudication by the relevant administrative agency, or 
the uniformity relied upon by the federal scheme will be destroyed. The 
federal scheme will fail without this mechanism.168
c. Other Contexts
Outside of the context of rate-setting and labor disputes, the Court has 
decided approximately three cases in the last six decades that use primary 
                                                                                                                     
165 Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U.S. at 199 n.29.
166 See supra Part II.B.1.a.
167 See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 381 U.S. at 684–85 (citing 
Western Pacific and Far East Conference to hold that the district court had jurisdiction to 
hear the case); see also Int’l. Bhd. of Boilermakers, 401 U.S. at 238 (citing Western Pacific
and Far East Conference to hold that the NLRB did not have “exclusive competence” to 
hear the case).
168 See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244 (“[T]o allow the States to control conduct which is 
the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes.”); 
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907) (“This 
clause . . . cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a common law right, the 
continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the 
act. In other words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.”).
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jurisdiction to send an issue to an administrative agency.169 While none of 
these cases can be called exclusive agency jurisdiction cases, neither are they 
pure advice referrals.
Two of the three involved referral to the Commodity Exchange 
Commission: Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange v. Deaktor.170 In Ricci, the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s
decision to stay an antitrust action against the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
while the Commodity Exchange Commission decided whether there had been 
a violation of the rules of the Exchange and the Commodity Exchange Act in 
the first instance (the petitioner alleged that his membership in the Exchange 
had been improperly transferred to another).171 The decision that the 
administrative proceedings should take place before the antitrust action went 
forward was based on three considerations:
(1) that it will be essential for the antitrust court to determine whether the 
Commodity Exchange Act or any of its provisions are “incompatible with the 
maintenance of an antitrust action”; (2) that some facets of the dispute 
between Ricci and the Exchange are within the statutory jurisdiction of the 
Commodity Exchange Commission; and (3) that adjudication of that dispute 
by the Commission promises to be of material aid in resolving the immunity 
question.172
In short, the Court thought it would be useful to the lower courts to know 
whether or not there had been a violation of the Exchange rules before it 
decided whether those rules constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. The 
Deaktor case followed the Ricci case and reversed the court of appeals for not 
ordering the district court to stay two cases challenging actions of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (the Exchange) while the Commodity Exchange 
Commission determined the issues within its jurisdiction.173
On one hand, Ricci and Deaktor can be characterized as exclusive agency 
jurisdiction cases. The majority in Ricci explains that if the Exchange’s action 
in transferring a petitioner’s membership were valid, then the courts would 
have to determine whether these rules violated the antitrust law or whether 
Congress meant to insulate them “from antitrust attack.”174 If, though, the 
action violated the Exchange’s rules, “the antitrust action should very likely 
take its normal course.”175 To properly decide the case, therefore, the lower 
courts must know the administrative outcome. But on the other hand, there is 
                                                                                                                     
169 See generally Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113, 115 (1973) (per 
curiam); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile 
Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
170 Deaktor, 414 U.S. at 115; Ricci, 409 U.S. at 302.
171 Ricci, 409 U.S. at 302.
172 Id. (citation omitted).
173 Deaktor, 414 U.S. at 115–16.
174 See Ricci, 409 U.S. at 303.
175 Id. at 304.
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no allegation that the antitrust action, if it proceeded concurrently with the 
administrative action, would destroy the regulatory scheme of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, nor would the antitrust action be in any way reviewing the 
decision of the administrative body (as courts would be doing in the rate-
setting and labor dispute cases). Therefore, this can be read as an advice case.
This characterization is supported by the dissenters in Ricci, who focus on the 
fact that “the Commodity Exchange Commission has neither the authority nor 
power to make a determination on the issues underlying the civil action.”176 In 
his dissent, Justice Marshall explains that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
must be used sparingly and carefully:
Where the plaintiff has no means of invoking agency jurisdiction, where the 
agency rules do not guarantee the plaintiff a means of participation in the 
administrative proceedings, and where the likelihood of a meaningful agency 
input into the judicial process is remote, I would strike a balance in favor of 
immediate court action.177
In Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court decided that it 
had been appropriate for the district court to refer a question of whether 
several drugs had to be classified as “new drugs,” and therefore be subjected to 
rigorous regulatory requirements, to the FDA for determination.178 The Court 
looked to the expertise of the FDA, explaining, “these are the kinds of issues 
peculiarly suited to initial determination by the FDA.”179 Turning to Ricci and 
Far East Conference for support, the Court found that this kind of question
was delegated to the agency by Congress, and “it is implicit in the regulatory 
scheme, not spelled out in haec verba, that FDA has jurisdiction to decide with 
administrative finality, subject to the types of judicial review provided, the 
‘new drug’ status of individual drugs or classes of drugs.”180 Although the 
Court does not state that an alternate conclusion would destroy the regulatory 
scheme, it does list the delay, inefficiency, and unfairness that would result if 
determinations such as this did not go to the FDA.181
2. Lower Courts
Each circuit has promulgated factors for courts to use in determining 
whether or not primary jurisdiction is appropriate in any particular situation.182
                                                                                                                     
176 Id. at 309 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 321 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178 See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653 (1973).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 653–54.
181 Id.
182 I focus on federal cases in this Part. Further study on whether there is significant 
difference between state and federal court primary jurisdiction practice is an important
project I hope to undertake in the future. Catherine M. Sharkey’s work on the difference 
between regulatory preemption by the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act in pharmaceutical 
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These factors derive from the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction 
jurisprudence and emphasize uniformity and expertise. The factors are as 
follows:
                                                                                                                     
cases in state and in federal courts shows that there are important conclusions to be drawn 
from the nuance of primary jurisdiction practice. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State 
Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013 (2007) (discussing the divergent approaches 
of state and federal courts in deciding whether the FDCA and accompanying regulations, 
promulgated by the FDA, preempt state failure to warn claims brought by pharmaceutical 
companies).
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Table 3: Factors Used to Determine Whether Primary Jurisdiction Is 
Appropriate
Circuit Primary Jurisdiction Factors
First “(1) whether the agency determination l[ies] at the heart of the 
task assigned the agency by Congress; (2) whether agency 
expertise [i]s required to unravel intricate, technical facts; and 
(3) whether, though perhaps not determinative, the agency 
determination would materially aid the court.”183
Second “(1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional 
experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy 
considerations within the agency’s particular field of expertise;
(2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the 
agency’s discretion;
(3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent 
rulings; and
(4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made.”184
“The court must also balance the advantages of applying the 
doctrine against the potential costs resulting from complications 
and delay in the administrative proceedings.”185
Third Same as Second Circuit.186
Fourth Same as Second Circuit.187
Fifth “[A]gency referral is favored when (a) it will promote even-
handed treatment and uniformity in a highly regulated area, or 
                                                                                                                     
183 Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 205 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 
981, 992 (1st Cir. 1995)). In Pejepscot, the court held that the district court did have 
subject matter jurisdiction over the shipping dispute, so it should not dismiss the case with 
prejudice but should stay the case and refer it to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) 
for expertise reasons. See id. at 205–06. Blackstone Valley involved a Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act claim, and the court held that 
the matter should be referred to the EPA for determination based on considerations of 
expertise and uniformity. Blackstone Valley, 67 F.3d at 992.
184 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 60 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222–23 (2d Cir. 
1995)). Primary jurisdiction did not warrant referring telecommunications billing case to 
the FCC. Id. at 61.
185 Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 46 F.3d at 223.
186 Baykeeper v. NL Indus., Inc., 660 F.3d 686, 691 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Glob. NAPs,
Inc. v. Bell Atl.–N.J., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 532, 549 (D.N.J. 2003)). An environmental 
citizen suit brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act did not require 
primary jurisdiction referral to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 
Id. at 692.
187 Longo v. Trojan Horse Ltd., 992 F. Supp. 2d 612, 617 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (citing 
Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n, 46 F.3d at 222). Primary jurisdiction did not require a stay in this 
ERISA case. Id.
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when sporadic action by federal courts would disrupt an 
agency’s delicate regulatory scheme; or (b) the agency 
possesses expertise in a specialized area with which the courts 
are relatively unfamiliar.”188
Sixth “A review of the case law shows that courts have considered 
referring matters to agencies for a variety of reasons: (1) to
advance regulatory uniformity; (2) to answer a 
‘question . . . within the agency’s discretion’; and (3) to benefit 
from ‘technical or policy considerations within the 
agency’s . . . expertise.’ ‘[T]he outstanding feature of the 
doctrine is . . . its flexibility permitting . . . courts to make a 
workable allocation of business between themselves and the 
agencies.’”189
Seventh “[W]e are at the heart of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 
when ‘in a suit involving a regulated firm but not brought under 
the regulatory statute itself, an issue arises that is within the 
exclusive original jurisdiction of the regulatory agency to 
resolve, although the agency’s resolution of it will usually be 
subject to judicial review. When such an issue arises, the suit 
must stop and the issue must be referred to the agency for 
resolution. If the agency’s resolution of the issue does not 
dispose of the entire case, the case can resume, subject to 
judicial review of that resolution along whatever path governs 
review of the agency’s decisions, whether back to the court in 
which the original case is pending or, if the statute governing 
review of the agency’s decisions designates another court, to 
that court.’”190
Eighth “Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction a court may leave an 
issue for agency determination when it involves the special 
                                                                                                                     
188 Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 811 (5th Cir. 2011). The court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the shipping dispute and referral to the STB under the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine was not warranted. Id.
189 Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2010) (alterations 
in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l Ltd., 443 
F.3d 48, 60 (2d Cir. 2006); then quoting Ellis v. Tribune Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 82–
83 (2d Cir. 2006); and then quoting Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Modern Air Transp., Inc., 179 
F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1950)). The court referred questions raised under the Telephone Act 
to the FCC under primary jurisdiction on the FCC’s urging. Id. at 461.
190 Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Ill., Inc., 551 F.3d 587, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563–64 (7th Cir. 2001)). The district court did 
have personal jurisdiction over the suit. Id. at 599. After threshold issues were resolved, 
reference to the Illinois Commerce Commission under the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
may be warranted. Id. at 596. Burford abstention was not appropriate because the issues 
were not of local concern. Id. at 595.
2017] PRIMARY JURISDICTION 571
expertise of the agency and would impact the uniformity of the 
regulated field.”191
Ninth “Although the question is a matter for the court’s discretion, 
courts in considering the issue have traditionally employed such 
factors as (1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been 
placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative 
body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that 
subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory 
authority that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in 
administration.”192
“Not every case that implicates the expertise of federal agencies 
warrants invocation of primary jurisdiction. Rather, the doctrine 
is reserved for a ‘limited set of circumstances’ that ‘requires 
resolution of an issue of first impression, or of a particularly 
complicated issue that Congress has committed to a regulatory 
agency.’ . . .
. . . Under our precedent, ‘efficiency’ is the ‘deciding factor’ in 
whether to invoke primary jurisdiction.”193
Tenth “[A] district court’s decision to invoke the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine ‘require[s] it to consider whether the issues of fact in 
the case: (1) are not within the conventional experience of 
judges; (2) require the exercise of administrative discretion; or 
(3) require uniformity and consistency in the regulation of the 
business entrusted to the particular agency.’ Additionally, when 
the regulatory agency has actions pending before it which may 
influence the instant litigation, invocation of the doctrine may 
be appropriate.”194
                                                                                                                     
191 Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. Soo Line R.R., 792 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
DeBruce Grain, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 149 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998)). The 
district court correctly referred the claim to the STB regarding whether a railway shipping 
requirement was reasonable. Id. at 913.
192 Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir.
2002). The issues were properly referred to the Register of Copyrights under primary 
jurisdiction. Id. at 782.
193 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2015) (first quoting 
Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008); and then quoting 
Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)).
194 TON Servs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 493 F.3d 1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2007) (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Crystal Clear Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell 
Tel. Co., 415 F. 3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2005)). The referral of a telecommunications 
dispute issue to the FCC was appropriate under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, but the 
case was remanded to the district court for proper consideration of the factors. See id. at 
1240.
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Eleventh Compared to Burford abstention; justifications for the rule of 
primary jurisdiction are expertise and uniformity.195
D.C. 
Circuit
“[W]e have found the primary jurisdiction doctrine applicable 
when the precise question before the district court was one 
within the particular competence of an agency: whether a tariff 
levied by local exchange carriers complied with FCC 
regulations, . . . or whether, under FDA regulations, a new drug 
was ‘safe and effective for interstate sale.’”196
Federal 
Circuit
“The doctrine of ‘primary jurisdiction’ requires that ‘in cases 
raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of 
judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative 
discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the 
subject matter should not be passed over.’”197 Courts look to 
experience and expertise.198
As we saw, the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction jurisprudence falls 
mainly into the “exclusive agency jurisdiction” category. In the rate-setting 
and labor dispute cases, the agency is required to weigh in on an issue before a 
court can. Many lower court primary jurisdiction cases199 are also exclusive 
                                                                                                                     
195 Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000). Primary 
jurisdiction or Burford abstention is inapplicable when federal law (in this case, the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) preempts state law. Id. at 1270.
196 United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832, 837–38 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted) (quoting Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 280 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)). Primary jurisdiction referral to the FDA is not appropriate for RICO claims. Id. at 
839.
197 Cal. Indus. Prods., Inc. v. United States, 436 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 219 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). There 
is no need to refer purely legal issues to the Customs Service. Id. at 1351.
198 Id. at 1350–51.
199 Since 2010, the federal courts of appeals have accepted referrals to administrative 
agencies pursuant to primary jurisdiction in only about nine cases. Five were labor cases. 
See Ignacio v. Cty. of Haw. Police Dep’t, 585 F. App’x. 645, 645 (9th Cir. 2014); Lydon v. 
Local 103, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 770 F.3d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 2014); DiPonio Constr. 
Co. v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers, Local 9, 687 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2012); Copeland v. 
Penske Logistics LLC, 675 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012); Int’l Union of Painter &
Allied Trades, Local 159 v. J & R Flooring, Inc., 616 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2010), 
withdrawn and superseded by 656 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2011). Two were in the realm of 
telecommunications. See Charvat v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 630 F.3d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 
2010); N. Cty. Commc’ns Corp. v. Cal. Catalog & Tech., 594 F.3d 1149, 1162 (9th Cir. 
2010). Two involved referrals to the FDA concerning specific issues of fact. See generally
Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2015) (referring the 
definition of “natural” in the context of cosmetics to the FDA); Endo Pharm. Inc. v. 
Actavis Inc., 592 F. App’x. 131 (3d Cir. 2014) (determining whether one party’s generic 
drug was equivalent to the other’s brand name drug, a question that had already been 
submitted by application to the agency).
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original jurisdiction cases like shipper/carrier rate disputes,200 labor 
disputes,201 and telecommunications rate-setting cases,202 but the broad 
rhetoric of the factors devised by the circuits for determining whether primary 
jurisdiction is appropriate (see chart above) supports a widening of the 
doctrine. Consider the First Circuit’s directive to see whether a determination 
would “materially aid” a court,203 and the Second Circuit’s instruction to look 
for whether there are technical or policy issues present that are within an 
agency’s expertise.204 These factors do not instruct courts to confine the use of 
primary jurisdiction to situations where an exercise of jurisdiction by the court 
would severely injure the regulatory scheme, as the Court explained would 
happen in the rate-setting and labor dispute cases.205
For example, lower courts apply primary jurisdiction to refer shipping 
disputes to the Surface Transport Board (STB) (the successor to the ICC) even 
in cases that do not involve rate-setting.206 The courts use balancing advice 
referral language to support this application, not the exclusive agency 
jurisdiction argument of Abilene Cotton, Far East Conference, and Western 
Pacific. For example, in Pejepscot Industrial Park, Inc. v. Maine Central 
Railroad Co., a shipper brought an action against a carrier alleging that the 
carrier violated a provision of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act that “requires carriers to provide service upon reasonable 
request.”207 The First Circuit found that referral to the STB would forward 
uniformity and expertise that “would materially aid the district court,” not that 
a judicial determination would destroy the regulatory scheme.208 Courts have 
also used primary jurisdiction to refer cases to the EPA in complex 
environmental law disputes,209 to the FDA in food-labeling cases,210 and to the 
                                                                                                                     
200 See, e.g., Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 197 (1st 
Cir. 2000).
201 See, e.g., Glaziers & Glassworkers Local Union No. 767 v. Custom Auto Glass 
Distribs., 689 F.2d 1339, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982).
202 See, e.g., Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 46 F.3d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 
1995).
203 See, e.g., Pejepscot, 215 F.3d at 205 (quoting Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley 
Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 992 (1st Cir. 1995)).
204 See, e.g., Nat’l Commcn’s Ass’n, 46 F.3d at 223; see also Federal Trade Comm’n v. 
Verity Int’l, Ltd., 433 F.3d 48, 60 (2d Cir. 2006). 
205 See supra note 83.
206 Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. Soo Line R.R., 792 F.3d 903, 912–13 (8th Cir. 2015); Elam 
v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 809–10 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that primary 
jurisdiction inapplicable here, but interpreting the provision of the ICCTA to arguably vest 
STB with “exclusive” primary jurisdiction over remedies in the ICCTA); Pejepscot, 215 
F.3d at 197.
207 Pejepscot, 215 F.3d at 197.
208 Id. at 205–06.
209 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 991 (1st Cir. 
1995).
210 See, e.g., In re Gen. Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., No. 12-249(KM), 2013 WL 
5943972, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013); Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) or state health agencies in 
Medicare and Medicaid disputes.211
Two of these issues—referral to CMS in challenges to state Medicaid 
plans and referral to the FDA in food-labeling consumer protection suits—
highlight the difference between the use of primary jurisdiction as a 
mechanism to enable congressionally intended exclusive original agency 
jurisdiction and as advice referral, and also how the lines between these 
categories can blur.
Both of these broad areas—food labeling and the provision of Medicaid—
involve complex federal schemes that interact with areas of state discretion 
and flexibility. And in both food labeling and Medicaid determinations, 
agency expertise and uniformity (to streamline marketing and to prevent 
discrimination) are recognized as important values by the courts.212 There are 
differences, however. Medicaid cases implicate a system closer to the rate-
setting cases in which the Supreme Court imagined primary jurisdiction a 
century ago,213 whereas food-labeling cases are pure advice referral cases.214
In the Medicaid cases, courts must negotiate the boundaries of areas where 
exclusive jurisdiction has been granted to administrative agencies, either 
statutorily or by longstanding court precedent, much as they do in the context 
of shipping cases and labor disputes.215 These primary jurisdiction cases look 
                                                                                                                     
JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (order granting in part and 
denying in part defendant’s motion to dismiss second amended class action complaint and 
staying matter); Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part and for referral to the 
United States Food and Drug Administration).
211 See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Morrish v. Olszewski, No. 09-13683, 2009 WL 5201792, at 
*8–9 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2009).
212 See infra notes 232–34.
213 See Wis. Hosp. Ass’n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226, 1232–33 (7th Cir. 1984); see also
Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy Westmoreland, The Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Inc. 
Medicaid Payment Case: Now What?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/04/30/the-armstrong-v-exceptional-child-inc-medicaid-
payment-case-now-what/ [https://perma.cc/F77P-DFFB].
214 See Archis A. Parasharami & Andrea Weiss, Primary Jurisdiction Is Gaining Some 
Weight in the Food Court, MAYER BROWN (June 2, 2014), http://www.classdefenseblog.co
m/2014/06/02/primary-jurisdiction-is-gaining-some-weight-in-the-food-court/ [https://per
ma.cc/9B8P-U5QH].
215 Compare Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 614 (2012)
(“After all, the agency is comparatively expert in the statute’s subject matter . . . . [T]o 
allow a Supremacy Clause action to proceed once the agency has reached a decision 
threatens potential inconsistency or confusion.”), with Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene 
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441 (1907) (explaining that conflicting determinations 
regarding the reasonableness of rates would undermine the purpose of the Interstate 
Commerce Act and “render the enforcement of the act impossible”), and Lodge 76, Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 139 (1976) (noting 
that the NLRA embodies “important federal interests in a uniform law of labor relations 
centrally administered by an expert agency”).
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very much like exhaustion cases at times.216 Food-labeling cases, on the other 
hand, sound in tort and state consumer protection law, which, notwithstanding 
the FDA’s and the FTC’s regulation of food labeling, maintain a continued 
vitality. In this area, we see courts that are uncomfortable grappling with areas 
of scientific uncertainty using advice referral primary jurisdiction to ask the 
FDA to fill regulatory gaps.217
a. Medicaid Cases
“Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program”218 which provides 
“federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of 
medical treatment for needy persons.”219 To take part in the program, states 
have to submit a plan and any amendments to the plan for approval by the 
CMS (a division of the Department of Health and Human Services).220 One of 
the goals of this centralized review is consistency and uniformity in 
application.221
Before I discuss primary jurisdiction in the context of Medicaid 
challenges, it is important to note that access to the courts for providers and 
beneficiaries of Medicaid seeking to challenge state plans has been vastly 
restricted.222 The Medicaid Act does not contain a private right of action.223 In 
March 2015, the Supreme Court held in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child 
Center, Inc. that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 
which providers had invoked to challenge a state Medicaid plan, does not 
either.224 The provision at issue in Armstrong was § 30(A) of the Medicaid 
Act, its “equal access provision,” which “requires that a state Medicaid plan 
must provide ‘payments . . . sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care 
and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care 
and services are available to the general population in the geographic 
                                                                                                                     
216 See e.g., Affiliates, Inc. v. Armstrong, Nos. 1:09-cv-00149-BLW, 1:11-cv-00307-
BLW, 2011 WL 3421407, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 4, 2011) (explaining the potential problems 
if the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare had implemented its state plan, but was 
subsequently rejected by CMS).
217 Cox v. Gurma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
July 11, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part and for referral to the United States 
Food and Drug Administration).
218 Indep. Living Ctr., 565 U.S. at 610.
219 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 650 (2003).
220 Indep. Living Ctr., 565 U.S. at 610; Affiliates, Inc., 2011 WL 3421407, at *1; Miller
ex rel. Morrish v. Olszewski, No. 09-13683, 2009 WL 5201792, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 
2009); see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.14–.15 (2015). 
221 Indep. Living Ctr., 565 U.S. at 610 (“Congress intended [uniformity] by 
centralizing administration of the federal program in the agency . . . .”).
222 See Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 213.
223 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015).
224 Id. at 1387–88. 
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area.’”225 The Court also found that the providers could not challenge the plan 
in equity.226 The full implications of this decision remain to be seen.
Before Armstrong, courts faced with a challenge by a private party to a 
state plan or policy that allegedly violated the Medicaid Act sometimes had to 
negotiate the timing of the lawsuit with pending CMS review. These cases, 
where exhaustion is not statutorily mandated but a determination by CMS on 
the amendment’s reasonableness is forthcoming, were appealing cases for the 
application of primary jurisdiction. Courts did not want to issue a ruling that 
would potentially conflict with a CMS ruling.227 In Douglas v. Independent 
Living Center of Southern California, which was the precursor to Armstrong,
for example, the Court decided not to decide the propriety of a Supremacy 
Clause action for the enforcement of the Medicaid statute because CMS had 
approved California’s challenged rate reductions during the pendency of the 
action.228 Plaintiffs brought the case while CMS’s review was pending, and it 
reached the Supreme Court during administrative review.229 CMS approved 
the rate reductions after the Court heard oral argument.230 Sending the case 
back to the Ninth Circuit to consider whether a Supremacy Clause challenge 
was appropriate in light of CMS’s approval, the Court used the language of 
expertise and uniformity to explain why it was important to give weight to the 
agency’s determination: “After all, the agency is comparatively expert in the 
statute’s subject matter. . . . [T]o allow a Supremacy Clause action to proceed 
once the agency has reached a decision threatens potential inconsistency or 
confusion.”231
Although it was not determining whether to refer the issue to CMS in 
Douglas, and therefore did not need to invoke primary jurisdiction, the Court’s
deference to the agency’s determination relied on the doctrine’s twin 
rationales. This was clearly a determination that has been placed within “the 
special competence” of an administrative body, here CMS.232 Indeed, Justice 
Breyer (who wrote the majority opinion in Douglas) says just this in a 2003 
concurrence—that a district court should invoke primary jurisdiction to refer a 
Medicaid plan amendment to the Department of Health and Human 
Services.233 This would allow the court the benefit of the Secretary’s views 
                                                                                                                     
225 Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 213 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Social Security Act § 1902(a)(30)(A), 42 U.S.C. 1396a (2012)). 
226 Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385.
227 See, e.g., Affiliates, Inc. v. Armstrong, Nos. 1:09-cv-00149BLW, 1:11-cv-00307-
BLW, 2011 WL 3421407, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 4, 2011).
228 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 616 (2012).
229 Id. at 613.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 614–15.
232 Miller ex rel. Morrish v. Olszewski, No. 09-13683, 2009 WL 5201792, at *8–9
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2009).
233 Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673–74 (2003) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (affirming court of appeals decision vacating injunction against 
implementation of Maine’s prescription drug rebate program).
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because “[i]nstitutionally speaking, that agency is better able than a court to 
assemble relevant facts . . . and to make relevant predictions.”234
Courts referring issues to CMS under the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
describe their decision as discretionary, and the referral as a way to gain the 
expertise of CMS and further the goals of the Medicaid Act.235 In Affiliates, 
Inc. v. Armstrong, a district court in Idaho held that the question of whether an 
Idaho state plan amendment complied with the Medicaid Act’s waiver 
provision was a matter “appropriately left to CMS,” because “while not unduly 
complex, uniformity in administration is critical.”236 In that case the court 
granted a preliminary injunction against the implementation of the state plan 
until CMS made its determination.237 In Miller ex rel. Morrish v. Olszewski, a 
district court in Michigan held that Michigan’s proposed plan amendment 
should be considered first by CMS, and stayed the case for approximately 
ninety days for the agency to consider the issue.238 And in Dartmouth-
Hitchcock Clinic v. Toumpas, a court in New Hampshire invoked Abilene 
Cotton, and invited CMS to appear “on an amicus basis or otherwise,” to 
provide its expert views.239 The court explained that getting the agency’s
views in a challenge to a New Hampshire Medicaid rate reduction “will 
certainly advance the sound disposition of this litigation, facilitate the 
Secretary’s own exercise of her administrative enforcement authority, and 
insure uniformity and consistency in results in similar cases nationwide.”240
It is hard to characterize the Medicaid primary jurisdiction cases. The 
courts treat them like advice referrals, using language of discretion and 
expertise, and with explanations that a referral to CMS would aid the court and 
forward the purposes of the regulatory scheme.241 Approval by CMS is 
mandatory, however, and disapproval by CMS would most likely nullify a 
judicial approval.242 For this reason, these cases fit comfortably with the 
Supreme Court’s rate-setting and labor dispute primary jurisdiction cases. And 
                                                                                                                     
234 Id. at 672.
235 Dartmouth–Hitchcock Clinic v. Toumpas, No. 11-cv-358-SM, 2012 WL 4482857, 
at *4 (D.N.H. Sept. 27, 2012) (“[T]he generality of the [Medicaid Act’s] goals and the 
structure for implementing them suggest that plan review by the Secretary is the central 
means of enforcement intended by Congress.” (quoting Long Term Care Pharmacy All. v. 
Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2004))); Affiliates, Inc. v. Armstrong, Nos. 1:09-cv-
00149-BLW, 1:11-cv-00307-BLW, 2011 WL 3421407, at *7 (D. Idaho Aug. 4, 2011).
236 Affiliates, Inc., 2011 WL 3421407, at *7.
237 Id. at *9.
238 Miller ex rel. Morrish v. Olszewski, No. 09-13683, 2009 WL 5201792, at *11 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 21, 2009).
239 Dartmouth–Hitchcock Clinic, 2012 WL 4482857, at *4–5.
240 Id. at *4.
241 See supra notes 218–26 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts 
referring issues to CMS under the primary jurisdiction doctrine as a way to gain the 
expertise of the CMS).
242 See, e.g., Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 613–16
(2012).
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fundamentally, Medicaid cases are rate-setting cases. This is acknowledged by 
both courts243 and commentators.244 Interestingly, one of the criticisms of the 
Armstrong case is that the majority relied, in part, on the complexity of rate-
setting to support its decision that courts were not the proper venue for the 
enforcement of Medicaid standards,245 but that “courts decide rate-setting 
cases all the time.”246 This is not the case, however. Leaving aside the 
question of whether it should be up to Congress or the Judiciary to make this 
decision, the primary jurisdiction doctrine has been used for over a century to 
remove rate-setting cases from judicial review and place them into the purview 
of administrative agencies.247
The affinity of the Medicaid primary jurisdiction cases with the rate-
setting and labor dispute primary jurisdiction cases becomes more apparent 
when the use of primary jurisdiction in these cases is juxtaposed with the 
doctrine’s use in food-labeling cases.
b. Food-Labeling Cases
There has been a large increase in the number of food-labeling class 
actions over the past half-decade, and the majority of these cases have been 
filed in California.248 The Northern District of California is nicknamed “the 
Food Court.”249 In these cases, plaintiffs allege that they have purchased a 
food product with a label that violates state law, either because it is mislabeled 
or because it is deceptive or misleading.250 Although food labeling is regulated 
                                                                                                                     
243 See Wis. Hosp. Ass’n v. Reivitz, 733 F.2d 1226, 1232–33 (7th Cir. 1984).
244 See Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 213 (criticizing the Armstrong
decision).
245 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015).
246 Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 213.
247 See supra Part II.B. 
248 Perkins Coie projected ninety-six food class actions filed in 2014, up from forty-
five in 2010 and nineteen in 2008. Information on file with author; see also Jessica Dye, 
Food Companies Confront Spike in Consumer Fraud Lawsuits, SUSTAINABILITY (June 13, 
2013), http://sustainability.thomsonreuters.com/2013/06/14/food-companies-confront-
spike-in-consumer-fraud-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/WKG8-DY8M] (citing data compiled 
by Perkins Coie).
249 Vanessa Blum, Welcome to Food Court, RECORDER (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://advance.lexis.com (in the “Filters” drop-down menu, select “Legal News” in the 
“Category” tab; search “Welcome to Food Court”); Glenn G. Lammi, Who’s Filling the 
‘Food Court’ with Lawsuits: Consumers or Lawyers, FORBES (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/07/22/whos-filling-the-food-court-with-lawsuits-con
sumers-or-lawyers/#331a57ac6235 [https://perma.cc/57EM-F9U2].
250 See e.g., Swearingen v. Santa Cruz Nat., Inc., No. C 13-04291 SI, 2014 WL 
1339775, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) (order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ first amended class action complaint) (alleging the labeling of products was 
misleading and deceptive), judgment set aside by 2014 WL 2967585 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 
2014).
2017] PRIMARY JURISDICTION 579
by the FDA, claims must be brought under state law because the Food Drug 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not contain a private right of action.251
The question of whether state law litigation is preempted by the FDCA is 
pervasive in these cases.252 Although the FDCA does not contain a global 
preemption provision, the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) of 
1990, which amended the FDCA’s food labeling provisions, does have an 
express preemption provision.253 This provision prohibits the establishment of 
any state or local labeling, product ingredient listing, health claim, or nutrient 
content claim requirements that are not identical to federal requirements,254
leaving room for the establishment of identical state and local requirements.255
If a claim is not expressly preempted by the NLEA, though, it may still be 
impliedly preempted by the FDCA.256
In addition to the preemption argument in these cases, defendants often 
argue that the court should refer these cases to the FDA under primary 
jurisdiction.257 Defendants allege that these issues, as to what comprises an
informative and truthful label, have been placed within the special competence 
                                                                                                                     
251 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2012) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to 
restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.”); 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001) (“The FDCA 
leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government rather than private litigants who are 
authorized to file suit for noncompliance with the medical device provisions . . . .”).
252 For more on preemption and food-labeling cases, see Diana R.H. Winters, The 
Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA as a Failed Statute, 89 TUL. L. REV. 815, 
830–35 (2015); see also Winters, supra note 27, at 244–46.
253 21 U.S.C. § 343-1. 
254 Id. § 343-1(a) (“[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may directly or 
indirectly establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate 
commerce . . . (2) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by section 
343(c), 343(e), 343(i)(2), 343(w), or 343(x) of this title that is not identical to the 
requirement of such section . . . [or] (3) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type 
required by section 343(b), 343(d), 343(f), 343(h), 343(i)(1), or 343(k) of this title that is 
not identical to the requirement of such section . . . [or] (4) any requirement for nutrition 
labeling of food that is not identical to the requirement of section 343(q) of this title . . . .”).
255 Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1178 (Cal. 2008) (“The words of 
section 343–1 clearly and unmistakably evince Congress’s intent to authorize states to 
establish laws that are ‘identical to’ federal law.” (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343-1)).
256 See, e.g., Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1123–24 (N.D. Cal. 
2010).
257 See Winters, supra note 27, at 252–54, for a more thorough discussion of these 
claims.
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of the FDA.258 This, according to the defendants, is evidenced by the 
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme of the FDCA and the NLEA.259
Courts have been generally reluctant to dismiss or stay food-labeling suits 
based on primary jurisdiction,260 with one exception—the context of 
“evaporated cane juice” (ECJ).261
ECJ is a term used by food manufacturers to indicate the inclusion of a 
specific type of sweetener in the food product.262 Plaintiffs in the many suits 
brought concerning this term263 allege that the use of ECJ violates the FDA’s
regulations that food labels must “reflect the common or usual name of an 
ingredient,” and for this reason violates state consumer protection laws.264 In 
2009, the FDA issued draft guidance “for comment purposes only,” explaining 
that ECJ was not the common or usual name of any kind of sweetener.265 In 
March 2014, the FDA reopened the comment period on this draft guidance, 
with the intention of issuing it in final form.266 Before March 2014, courts 
considering this issue had sporadically accepted the primary jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                     
258 Swearingen v. Santa Cruz Nat., Inc., No. C 13-04291 SI, 2014 WL 1339775, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2014) (order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ first 
amended class action complaint) (“Santa Cruz argues that, because food labeling is within 
the special competence of the FDA . . . the Court should apply the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction, defer to the agency, and dismiss the action without prejudice.”), judgment set 
aside by 2014 WL 2967585 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2014).
259 See, e.g., Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part and for referral to the 
United States Food and Drug Administration) (referring issue of whether a food containing 
genetically engineered ingredients could be labeled “natural” to the FDA to avoid the risk 
of “‘usurp[ing] the FDA’s interpretive authority[,]’ and ‘undermining, through privation 
litigation, the FDA’s considered judgments’” (alterations in original) (quoting Pom 
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1176, 1178 (9th Cir. 2012))).
260 Theodore E. Tsekerides & Melody E. Akhavan, FDA’s Primary Jurisdiction Won’t
Save Food Manufacturers, LAW360 (July 17, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/5575
04/fda-s-primary-jurisdiction-won-t-save-food-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/CBZ3-
VEJV] (seeing “a pattern of limited, waning success for defendants” arguing for FDA’s
primary jurisdiction).
261 Since 2013, there have been published decisions that discuss primary jurisdiction in 
the context of food-labeling litigation in close to seventy cases. Courts have accepted the 
primary jurisdiction argument in about thirty of these cases. See Diana R.H. Winters, 
Primary Jurisdiction Chart (Jan. 9, 2017) (unpublished research) (on file with author).
About two-thirds of the accepted cases have involved the issue of evaporated cane juice. 
262 Swearingen, 2014 WL 1339775, at *1.
263 In 2013, ninety-four food class actions were filed, and approximately 28% of these 
were on the issue of evaporated cane juice. Research by Perkins Coie (on file with author). 
This number went down somewhat in 2014: out of sixty-four class actions filed by mid-
October, 8% involved evaporated cane juice. See supra note 261.
264 Swearingen, 2014 WL 1339775, at *1.
265 Id. at *2 (quoting the 2009 draft guidance).
266 Id. at *3. 
2017] PRIMARY JURISDICTION 581
argument.267 After the FDA’s reopening of the comment period, however, 
most courts considering the issue stayed or dismissed these actions under the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine to await a definitive FDA statement on the 
matter.268
As of mid-2015, there has been no FDA statement on ECJ, and the ECJ 
cases stayed or dismissed by courts in mid-2014 are starting to return to the 
courts now. In one case the court vacated its dismissal without prejudice on the 
grounds that the FDA had primary jurisdiction over the ECJ issue, entering a 
stay pursuant to the doctrine instead.269 The court found that although 
plaintiffs did not move for a stay when the case was dismissed, “the Court 
[was] persuaded that Plaintiffs were unaware at that time how long it would 
take the FDA to issue final guidance on the use of the term ECJ.”270 Another 
court issued an order almost a year after it had stayed an ECJ case requesting 
that the Commissioner of the FDA “inform the Court whether a final 
determination regarding ECJ ‘is feasible within agency priorities and 
resources.’ . . . In particular, the Court would like to know if the FDA is likely 
to issue any further guidance regarding ECJ within the next 180 days.”271
Although ECJ cases compose the majority of accepted primary jurisdiction 
cases, courts have stayed or dismissed cases under the doctrine in other 
contexts as well. Primary jurisdiction has been accepted in cases involving 
issues such as whether a food containing genetically engineered ingredients 
can be labeled “natural,” whether a particular label constitutes an implied 
health claim, and whether a claim of “zero impact” violates California 
consumer protection laws.272 The cases regarding “natural” claims were stayed 
                                                                                                                     
267 Compare Hood v. Wholesoy & Co., No. 12-cv-5550-YGR, 2013 WL 3553979, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2013), with Kane v. Chobani, Inc., No. 12-CV-02425-LHK, 2013 
WL 3703981, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 12) (order granting in part and denying in part motion 
to dismiss the first amended complaint), order vacated, 2013 WL 5529723 (N.D. Cal. July 
25, 2013).
268 See Parasharami & Weiss, supra note 214.
269 Swearingen v. Attune Foods, Inc., No. C 13-4541 SBA, 2015 WL 370167, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2015) (order granting motion to alter or amend judgment and/or for 
relief from judgment).
270 Id. at *4.
271 Swearingen v. Healthy Beverage, LLC, No. 3:13-cv-4385 EMC, slip op. at 1–2
(N.D. Cal. May 15, 2015) (order regarding Food & Drug Administration action and referral 
to commissioner). The “agency priorities and resources” language is from 21 C.F.R. 
§ 10.25(c) (2016), which provides: “The Commissioner will institute a proceeding to 
determine whether to . . . take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative 
action whenever any court, on its own initiative, holds in abeyance or refers any matter to 
the agency for an administrative determination and the Commissioner concludes that an 
administrative determination is feasible within agency priorities and resources.”
272 See In re Kind LLC “Healthy and All Natural” Litigation, 209 F. Supp. 3d 689, 692 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); Haggag v. Welch Foods, Inc., No. CV 13-00341-JGB (OPx), 2014 WL 
1246299, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014); Watkins v. Vital Pharm., Inc., No. CV 12-09374 
SJO (JCx), 2013 WL 5972174, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2013).
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for six months while the issue was appealed to the FDA,273 but the FDA 
declined the invitation to rule on the issue.274
Similarly, the FDA declined to define “natural” in the context of cosmetic 
products. In a case regarding whether cosmetics containing certain synthetic 
ingredients could be labeled “natural,” a district court stayed the case under 
primary jurisdiction.275 Plaintiffs’ counsel then wrote to the FDA requesting 
the agency’s input on the issue, and the FDA declined the request by letter.276
Notwithstanding the FDA’s refusal to answer a plaintiff’s inquiry in this case,
as well as the agency’s refusal in earlier cases involving the word “natural,”
the Ninth Circuit approved of the district court’s stay of the case under 
primary jurisdiction (although it did remand the case for the court to enter a 
stay instead of a dismissal, and for the court to consider whether primary 
jurisdiction was still warranted in light of recent developments).277 The Ninth 
Circuit explained that the most important factor in determining whether 
primary jurisdiction was warranted was efficiency, and that “a court should not 
invoke primary jurisdiction when the agency is aware of but has expressed no 
interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”278 The district court had acted 
appropriately on the record before it,279 but should take these considerations 
into account on remand.
                                                                                                                     
273 In re Gen. Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., No. 12-249(KM), 2013 WL 5943972, at *1 
(D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013); Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 
5530017, at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (order granting in part and denying in part 
defendant’s motion to dismiss second amended class action complaint and staying matter);
Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 
2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part and for referral to the United States Food 
and Drug Administration).
274 Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm’r for Policy, FDA, to Honorable Yvonne 
Gonzalez Rodgers, Honorable Jeffrey S. White & Honorable Kevin McNulty (Jan. 6, 
2014), http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/FDA%20Lrt%201-2014%20re%20Natural.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KDM4-XCEG]. On November 10, 2015, the FDA requested comments on the use 
of the term “natural” on human food products. See FDA Requests Comments on Use of the 
Term “Natural” on Food Labeling, FDA: CONSTITUENT UPDATE,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/NewsEvents/ConstituentUpdates/ucm471919.htm [https://perma.
cc/F67L-2Y8Z] (last updated Dec. 24, 2015). It is possible that this call for comments may 
lead to an increase in cases stayed or dismissed under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, 
although the FDA has given no timeframe for action. See Sarah L. Brew & Courtney A. 
Lawrence, FDA Takes a Step Forward on ‘Natural’ Food Labeling, LAW360 (Nov. 25, 
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/731406/fda-takes-a-step-forward-on-natural-food-
labeling [https://perma.cc/K6PG-3RMD]. This comment period is now closed.
275 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016–17 (N.D. Cal. 
2012), rev’d and remanded, 783 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2015).
276 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 759–60 (9th Cir. 2015).
277 Id. at 761–62. 
278 Id. at 761. 
279 Id. The primary jurisdiction dismissal was entered prior to the FDA declining the 
invitations to define “natural” in the context of food labeling and cosmetics.
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Primary jurisdiction referrals to CMS in the context of the Medicaid 
regulatory scheme are fundamentally different than those in the food-labeling 
area. CMS approval of state plans and state plan changes is mandatory, and a 
conflicting court decision would “defeat the uniformity that Congress intended 
by centralizing administration of the federal program in the agency.”280 This 
language invokes the rhetoric used to justify the primary jurisdiction of the 
ICC in rate-setting cases281 and the NLRB in labor disputes.282 The food-
labeling regulatory scheme, on the other hand, maintains space for state 
regulation alongside federal regulation.283 Uniformity is prioritized in certain 
areas, and Congress included an express preemption provision in the NLEA to 
protect this interest.284 Areas that fall outside of the NLEA and that have not 
been ruled upon by the FDA—like what “natural” means—are not areas that 
the FDA is required to review and are subject to state consumer protections.285
Moreover, there is a difference between the regulated activities in the 
food-labeling and the Medicaid cases. In the food-labeling cases, the agency is 
regulating the provision of information to consumers for the purpose of 
protecting the health of the consumer and the integrity of the marketplace. The 
information itself, though, is not created by the agency, nor, in many instances, 
is it independently verifiable. The questions the food-labeling litigation 
engages are matters of subjective judgment. For example, litigants challenge 
whether a food labeled “natural” can contain genetically modified 
ingredients.286 Because the FDA has not defined the word “natural,”287 the 
answer to this question is a matter of judgment. In these cases, plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                     
280 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 615 (2012).
281 See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441 
(1907) (explaining that conflicting determinations regarding the reasonableness of rates 
would undermine the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act and “render the enforcement 
of the act impossible”).
282 See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 
U.S. 132, 139 (1976) (explaining that the NLRA embodies “important federal interests in a 
uniform law of labor relations centrally administered by an expert agency”); see also 
Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953) (“Congress evidently 
considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary 
to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and 
conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor 
controversies.”).
283 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (recognizing the “historic 
primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety”); Winters, supra note 252, at 
831–33.
284 Winters, supra note 252, at 830–31.
285 See, e.g., Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part and for referral to the 
United States Food and Drug Administration) (holding that the FDCA and NLEA 
“unquestionably and squarely” give the FDA the authority to determine whether food 
labels “may properly state that GMO products can be labeled ‘all natural.’”).
286 See id.
287 See id.
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invoke state consumer protection and deceptive practices laws for activities 
that also implicate federal law.288 In Medicaid cases, however, the question 
specifically regards the operation of federal law.289 Moreover, CMS is 
statutorily required to review amendments to state Medicaid plans.290 Whether 
or not the plan conforms to federal standards is for CMS to determine.291
In short, we see primary jurisdiction used in different forms: (1) In its 
exclusive agency jurisdiction incarnation, like in the rate-setting and labor 
dispute cases, (2) in its advice referral incarnation, like in the food-labeling 
cases, and (3) somewhere in between, like the Medicaid cases, that resemble 
rate-setting cases but use advice referral language. But is primary jurisdiction, 
in any of these forms, ever appropriate? Should courts be able to abstain from 
exercising their jurisdiction without a direct congressional directive?292 In the 
next Part, I look at where the doctrine fits into scholarly discussions of when it 
is appropriate for courts to choose not to hear cases otherwise within their 
jurisdiction.
III. THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO EXPAND PRIMARY JURISDICTION
In the previous Part, I looked at how primary jurisdiction has developed 
over the course of the last century, and the areas in which it has been applied 
most often. In this Part, I take a detour into the debate over another doctrine,
“under which considerations of justiciability or comity lead courts to abstain 
from deciding questions whose initial resolution is better suited to another 
time, or another forum.”293 These doctrines include abstention, ripeness, 
mootness, and the political question doctrine.294 Primary jurisdiction is most 
similar to abstention; courts choose not to hear cases that they otherwise 
could.295 The debate over abstention speaks to a consideration of the propriety 
of the use of primary jurisdiction as a matter of legal authority and process. I
conclude that to resolve the question of the legitimacy of primary jurisdiction 
we must look to the consequences of its use, which I do in the next Part.
Abstention comprises several “doctrines under which federal courts may 
choose to decline to exercise their jurisdiction over cases otherwise 
                                                                                                                     
288 See, e.g., Swearingen v. Santa Cruz Nat. Inc., No. C 13-04291 SI, 2014 WL 
1339775, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2014) (order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ first amended class action complaint), judgement set aside by 2014 WL 2967585 
(N.D. Cal. July 1, 2014).
289 See generally Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606 (2012).
290 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.14–.15 (2015).
291 Id. § 430.15.
292 In the first category, that of exclusive agency jurisdiction, it is arguably a direct 
congressional directive that requires the doctrine’s use.
293 Zivotofsky ex rel Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1434 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (citations omitted).
294 Id.
295 See id.
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appropriately before them.”296 The oldest of the abstention doctrines, Pullman
abstention, named by the 1941 case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman Co., counsels a federal court to abstain from hearing a case where 
there is unclear state law, the state court resolution of which could eliminate 
the necessity of a decision on a constitutional question.297 In addition to 
Pullman abstention, there is Burford abstention (abstention because of unclear 
state law and complex administrative procedures),298 Thibodaux abstention 
(uncertain state law and important state interests),299 Younger abstention 
(pending state court criminal proceedings),300 and Colorado River abstention 
(parallel state proceedings).301
While abstention involves federal courts abstaining in deference to state 
court proceedings and primary jurisdiction involves courts, usually federal but 
sometimes state, deferring to administrative agencies, the doctrines have much
in common. In both contexts a court decides in deference to another entity not 
to determine a question over which it otherwise has jurisdiction, based on 
judicially created doctrine.302 While certain of the abstention doctrines, like 
Burford, require the court to dismiss the case,303 thus terminating federal court 
review, in others, like Pullman, the federal court retains jurisdiction so that it 
can determine remaining federal issues after the state law issues are 
resolved.304 This is similar to primary jurisdiction procedure, where courts will 
dismiss without prejudice or stay a case pending agency determination of the 
relevant issue.
For decades, commentators have discussed the legitimacy and the 
propriety of the abstention doctrines, a debate that is highly relevant to the 
consideration of primary jurisdiction.305
                                                                                                                     
296 William P. Marshall, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and Recasting the Meaning 
of Judicial Restraint, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 881, 883 (2013).
297 Id.; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058–59, 1062–63 (6th ed. 2009).
298 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943); Gordon G. Young, Federal 
Court Abstention and State Administrative Law from Burford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years 
of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 859, 870–71 (1993).
299 La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1959); Marshall, 
supra note 296, at 883–84.
300 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971); Marshall, supra note 296, at 884.
301 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18
(1976); Marshall, supra note 296, at 884.
302 Compare Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952), with 
Marshall, supra note 296, at 883–84.
303 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 803 (5th ed. 2007).
304 England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964) (“[A]bstention 
‘does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the 
postponement of its exercise.’” (quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959))).
305 Many of these debates begin with Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous 1821 
statement regarding the mandatory grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts: 
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In the 1980s, Professor Martin H. Redish wrote Abstention, Separation of 
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,306 which has been called “one 
of the most important and transformative accounts of the law of federal 
courts,”307 and a “landmark.”308 The thesis of Redish’s article, which 
Professor William P. Marshall called “as simple as it was elegant,”309 was that 
the abstention doctrines violate the principle of separation of powers and are 
wrong “as a matter of legal process.”310 Redish also argued that as matters of 
policy the costs of abstention outweigh its benefits, and “that their total 
abolition would not seriously undermine the efficient workings of judicial 
federalism.”311
The principle of the separation of powers is enshrined in the structure of 
our government: “The Framers perceived that ‘[t]he accumulation of all 
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, 
a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’”312 For this reason, “the 
Framers vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate 
branches.”313 Redish explained the principle of separation of powers between 
the Judicial and Legislative Branches as a question of the proper role of an 
unelected Judiciary.314 The only laws that such a body can invalidate are those 
that are unconstitutional.315 Otherwise, the Judicial Branch has no power to 
                                                                                                                     
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not. but [sic] it is 
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. . . . We have no more right to 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not 
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution [sic]. Questions may 
occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
306 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
307 Marshall, supra note 296, at 883.
308 Id.; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on 
the Distinction Between “Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory Interpretation and 
Judicial Lawmaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 850 (2013).
309 Marshall, supra note 296, at 889.
310 Redish, supra note 306, at 74.
311 Id. Besides Professor Redish’s separation of powers critique of abstention, there are 
several other common criticisms of the doctrines. Professor Marshall distills these to seven, 
including the complicated nature of the area of law because of the multiple types of 
abstention, and the tendency of abstention to result in “nightmares in judicial 
administration.” Marshall, supra note 296, at 884–87. Moreover, he writes that “abstention 
is inconsistent with the Court’s own rhetoric,” and points to the language from Cohens v. 
Virginia cited above. Id. at 886.
312 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, 
J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison)).
313 Id. at 962. 
314 See Redish, supra note 306, at 76–77.
315 Id. at 76.
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refuse jurisdiction that has been granted to it by the Legislative Branch.316
Repealing or altering the legislative scheme, which granted enforcement 
power to federal courts, manifests “disagreement with the social policy 
choices that the scheme manifests,” and an unacceptable usurpation of 
legislative power.317
Redish categorized abstention doctrines as “partial abstention” doctrines—
which encompass the traditional abstention doctrines—and “total abstention”
theories, which “would effectively prohibit the federal courts from enforcing 
federal civil rights laws, in particular section 1983, and from exercising their 
congressionally-vested jurisdiction to enforce those laws,” and he found 
neither to be justified.318 He argued that Congress did not impliedly delegate
the power to modify a jurisdictional grant to courts,319 that the abstention 
doctrines cannot stem from equity,320 and that the abolition of abstention 
would not have catastrophic effects on the judicial system.321 Ultimately, 
according to Redish, “[the] electorally accountable legislature [should] make 
the basic policy decisions concerning how the nation is to be governed. . . . not 
the judiciary.”322
A year after Redish’s article was published, Professor David L. Shapiro 
responded to Redish’s separation of powers critique of abstention.323 Shapiro 
argued that the judicial discretion at the heart of abstention—which Redish 
found to be an inappropriate usurpation of legislative authority—is consistent 
with our legal tradition, and is also a good thing, normatively speaking.324 He 
began by outlining the instances where courts have “been free to choose 
whether or not to exercise or assume jurisdiction,”325 and then explained that,
because it is difficult to determine when a grant of jurisdiction permits a court 
to exercise discretion to modify or decline this jurisdiction,326 “the courts are 
functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than is the 
legislature.”327 Shapiro looked to equitable discretion, federalism and comity, 
separation of powers, and judicial administration as discretionary factors that 
can be weighed against a presumption in favor of exercising jurisdiction, and 
discussed their importance to our jurisprudential tradition.328 He argued that 
                                                                                                                     
316 Id. at 77.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 72–74 (footnote omitted).
319 Id. at 81.
320 Redish, supra note 306, at 84.
321 Id. at 74, 91.
322 Id. at 115.
323 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 544 (1985).
324 Id. at 545.
325 Id. at 546.
326 See id. at 545–70.
327 Id. at 574.
328 See id. at 579–88.
588 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:3
judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction can lead to a “productive 
dialogue . . . between the courts and the legislature.”329
Shapiro’s critique of Redish’s criticism of the abstention doctrine was 
rooted in the entrenched presence of judicial discretion regarding judicial 
authority in our legal tradition and in the desirable consequences of this 
system. Professor Richard H. Fallon, writing in 2013, agreed with Shapiro, and 
found Redish to be wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation, as a matter of 
democratic theory, and as a matter of the rule of law.330 In terms of 
interpreting the jurisdictional statutes, Redish’s assertion as to the ultimate 
illegitimacy (not merely incorrectness) of the abstention doctrines could not 
stand.331 As to democratic theory, Redish’s accounting of the division of 
authority between the Legislature and the Judiciary was too narrow.332 And 
regarding legal process, Fallon agreed with Shapiro that judicial discretion is 
deeply rooted in our legal tradition.333 Moreover, the role of precedent in our 
legal system would speak to maintaining the abstention doctrines, 
regardless.334
While Shapiro and Fallon focused on the need to view abstention in its 
historical and normative contexts to critique Redish, other critics just found 
him to be wrong. Marshall wrote that scholars found Redish to be wrong in his 
reading of § 1983, in his reading of the jurisdictional statutes, and in his 
reading of how jurisdiction is allocated.335 Marshall too, while finding 
Redish’s article “brilliant, creative, and prescient,” also found it 
unconvincing.336
The debate over the legitimacy and wisdom of the abstention doctrines 
speaks directly to the appropriateness and utility of the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine. Although the entity to which the court directs the question it declines 
is different—state courts in abstention cases, administrative agencies in 
primary jurisdiction cases—the role of the court is similar. In each instance,
the court decides whether or not to exercise the jurisdiction it was granted. The 
fact that courts in primary jurisdiction cases retain jurisdiction for later 
adjudication of remaining issues does not necessarily change the calculation; 
to Redish, “even a delay in the exercise of federal jurisdiction may be 
considered a violation of separation of powers if it has not been contemplated 
by Congress.”337 Is the use of primary jurisdiction appropriate as a matter of 
legal process and wise as a matter of policy? In the next Part, I look at the 
implications of the granting of primary jurisdiction to administrative agencies, 
                                                                                                                     
329 Shapiro, supra note 323, at 577.
330 Fallon, supra note 308, at 859–61, 863, 870–71. 
331 Id. at 859–60.
332 Id. at 863. 
333 Id. at 870.
334 Id.
335 Marshall, supra note 296, at 893–94.
336 Id. at 892.
337 Redish, supra note 306, at 90.
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in both exclusive original jurisdiction and advice referral cases, and try to 
answer these questions.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Part II of this Article analyzed the history, trajectory, and application of 
the primary jurisdiction doctrine by courts over the last century of its use. Part 
III discussed a scholarly debate over the legitimacy and wisdom of the 
abstention doctrines, to which primary jurisdiction is a close relative. In this 
Part, I pivot to look at the consequences of the determination to use primary 
jurisdiction, and the implications of the doctrine.
I focus here on legal process and on policy implications and leave 
constitutional implications to the side, for the most part. Professor Martin H. 
Redish’s argument that the traditional abstention doctrines violated the 
principle of separation of powers because they “could be characterized as a 
judicial usurpation of legislative authority,”338 has failed to gain traction.339 In 
addition to the compelling scholarly critiques of his work, it appears that the 
theory has never been taken up, much less accepted by the Supreme Court.340
In 2008, Professor Catherine T. Struve explored whether a hypothetical 
statute requiring courts to “refer to the FDA issues arising in tort suits 
concerning FDA-approved drugs” would be constitutional under Article III
(protecting separation of powers values) and under the Seventh 
Amendment.341 She concludes that such a statute could pass Article III 
scrutiny if courts were very careful to maintain the FDA as an “adjunct” to the 
court’s decision making.342 The adjunct model, according to Struve, would 
entail a court deferring to FDA findings of fact while reviewing legal issues de 
novo.343 Because “separation-of-powers concerns are stronger when Congress 
seeks to assign to a non-Article-III tribunal the adjudication of a claim that 
Congress has not created,” (i.e. in her hypothetical situation, Congress is 
mandating courts refer state tort suits to the FDA) courts must be bound to
primary jurisdiction to avoid constitutional problems.344 She suggests, “the 
more searching the review, the more likely the referral will fit within the 
‘adjunct’ model.”345 As to the Seventh Amendment, Professor Struve 
concludes that the use of primary jurisdiction would only be constitutional if 
                                                                                                                     
338 Id. at 76.
339 Marshall, supra note 296, at 892. 
340 Id. (“The Supreme Court, as far as I am aware, has never directly engaged the 
theory that abstention constitutes a constitutional violation of separation of powers . . . .”).
341 Struve, supra note 17, at 1043.
342 Id. at 1050. 
343 Id. at 1051.
344 Id. at 1052, 1054.
345 Id. at 1054.
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the FDA’s findings were deemed prima facie evidence and if a jury could 
reexamine the issues determined by the FDA.346
There is no statute on the table such as the one posed by Struve.
Nevertheless, courts are currently referring issues to the FDA in food-labeling 
cases, in which plaintiffs seek both damages and injunctive relief.347 It is 
difficult to judge whether these cases comply with Struve’s recommendations, 
as the cases that have been referred to the FDA and have then returned to court 
are few, if any.348 I address problems with these cases under the policy Part
below. Regardless, however, it is important to flag the constitutional concern 
for future advice referral state tort suits.349
A. Rule of Law
Professor Richard H. Fallon interprets Redish’s argument against 
abstention as involving a rule of law argument in addition to the one regarding 
democratic accountability and the proper role of an unelected Judiciary.350
Fallon characterizes Redish as asserting “that abstention doctrines . . . had 
come so unloosed from the traditional disciplines of law and the ‘legal
process’ that they affronted the ideal of the rule of law.”351 Fallon disagrees 
that abstention violates rule of law values, pointing to Professor David 
Shapiro’s description of abstention as consistent with our legal tradition, and 
to the Supreme Court’s moves to cabin the doctrine.352 Moreover, he points to 
the importance of precedent to argue against the wholesale abolition of the 
abstention doctrines, writing that “rule of law ideals require reasonable 
stability.”353
In the context of primary jurisdiction, while exclusive agency jurisdiction 
primary jurisdiction cases have a long history and can be seen as consistent 
with our legal tradition,354 advice referral primary jurisdiction cases do not 
                                                                                                                     
346 Id. at 1059–60.
347 See Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800 (N.D. Cal. 
July 11, 2013) (order granting motion to dismiss in part and for referral to the United States 
Food and Drug Administration); Winters, supra note 252, at 853–55.
348 Shortly after the staying and dismissing of several cases involving the meaning of 
the term “natural,” the FDA refused to define the term. See infra note 382.
349 Struve’s analysis does not apply to the exclusive original jurisdiction cases. These 
comply with her “adjunct” model in that courts are refusing to consider the issue, whether 
it be rate-setting or labor disputes, until the agency has. See Struve, supra note 17, at 1049.
The court retains jurisdiction, and the issue is then subject to judicial review. 
350 Fallon, supra note 308, at 865.
351 Id. at 866. Fallon acknowledges that he is reading Redish “liberally and loosely.”
Id.
352 Id. at 867.
353 Id. at 870.
354 See supra Part II (discussing the history of the primary jurisdiction doctrine); see 
also Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing exclusive agency 
jurisdiction as the doctrine’s “central and original form”).
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have the same sort of background. The doctrine was conceived in, and has 
mainly been applied to, rate-setting and labor dispute cases.355 The Supreme 
Court interpreted the statutory scheme in these contexts as prohibiting court 
determination of the relevant questions.356 A judicial determination in these 
areas would destroy the legislative scheme and undermine the statutory 
purpose. The doctrine’s extension to pure advice referral cases—like the food-
labeling context—is unmoored from this background. In that area, Congress 
allocated decisionmaking authority between the courts and administrative 
agencies, and a court’s determination that this allocation is wrong, or 
inefficient, or otherwise unwise, is not enough to shift this allocation.
If, however, an argument could be made that the benefits of the advice 
referral outweighed the costs of this type of primary jurisdiction, or that its use 
is crucial to the interaction between courts and agencies, maybe the advice 
referral could still be justified. The exclusive original jurisdiction strain of 
primary jurisdiction was imagined in the early twentieth century, before the 
birth of the modern administrative state.357 Perhaps its extension to the advice 
referral is a natural response to the administrative state and can provide a 
mechanism for courts and agencies to engage in productive dialogue.358
Redish’s critics make this policy argument in support of the abstention 
doctrines. For example, Shapiro writes, “the continued exercise of discretion 
in these matters [(the abstention doctrines)] has much to contribute to the 
easing of interbranch and intergovernmental tensions in our complex system of 
government,”359 and Fallon explains that Redish’s critics (including Shapiro), 
“appear[] to rely on the notion . . . that acceptance of broad judicial discretion 
in the interpretation of jurisdictional legislation will yield good results.”360
The advice referral, however, results in delay and the loss of state law 
benefits, and has the potential to interfere with agency decisionmaking.
Moreover, its perceived benefits—a fostering of uniformity and expertise—are 
specters.
B. Primary Jurisdiction’s Consequences
The use of the primary jurisdiction doctrine results in delay. At the very 
least, the lawsuit will be delayed by a specific amount of time (sixty days, 
ninety days) to give the relevant agency time to weigh in on an issue, before 
                                                                                                                     
355 See supra Tables 1 & 2.
356 See supra Part II.B.1.a–.b. 
357 See supra Part II.B.
358 Shapiro writes regarding the division of authority between courts and the 
Legislature regarding jurisdictional discretion that “[p]rinciples of separation and allocation 
of powers seldom involve rigid boundaries.” Shapiro, supra note 323, at 577.
359 Id. at 545.
360 Fallon, supra note 308, at 878.
592 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:3
the case returns to court.361 And in many situations, courts issue a stay or 
dismiss a case without prejudice without setting a time frame.362 Lengthy 
delays are inevitable as litigants approach the relevant agency, request a 
determination, and then reapproach the court in the event of a decision or the 
failure of the agency to consider the question. This was taking place in the 
food-labeling context as this Article was being written. Although the Ninth 
Circuit states that “[u]nder our precedent, ‘efficiency’ is the ‘deciding factor’
in whether to invoke primary jurisdiction,” and that “efficiency” precludes 
needless delay,363 courts within the circuit continue to apply the doctrine to 
refer cases to the FDA, an agency that has shown itself to be subject to 
delay.364 For example, courts were reconsidering their dismissals without 
prejudice for primary jurisdiction referrals to the FDA in the ECJ context as 
the FDA failed to issue expected final guidance.365 Moreover, an 
administration that has promised to reduce federal regulation has just taken
office.366 This will mean, most likely, less agency resources available to 
respond to court calls for clarification of nuanced food-labeling regulations.
In exclusive agency jurisdiction cases, the delay is necessary because the 
agency must rule before the case can continue, and leaving this determination 
to the agency forwards the regulatory scheme. In rate-setting cases, for 
example, the case is stayed or dismissed without prejudice for the agency (i.e. 
the ICC or STB) to consider the reasonableness of the challenged rate. This 
maintains consistency, and avoids rate discrimination, thereby fulfilling the 
purposes of the ICA.367 The case may return to the court for the adjudication 
of remaining issues.
                                                                                                                     
361 See, e.g., Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C 12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017, 
at *9 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2013) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s 
motion to dismiss second amended class action complaint and staying matter) (staying the 
case for six months “for an administrative determination, the question of whether and 
under what circumstances food products containing ingredients produced using 
bioengineered ingredients may or may not be labeled as ‘Natural’”); Miller ex rel. Morrish 
v. Olszewski, No. 09-13683, 2009 WL 5201792, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 2009) 
(staying case for 120 days pending a determination by CMS on whether Michigan’s state 
plan amendment is to be approved).
362 See, e.g., Hood v. Wholesoy & Co., No.12-cv-5550-YGR, 2013 WL 3553979, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. July 12, 2013) (dismissing the case without prejudice so the FDA can determine 
the ECJ issue).
363 Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)).
364 See Lisa Heinzerling, Undue Process at the FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and 
Agency Intransigence, 37 VT. L. REV. 1007, 1029 (2013) (describing FDA delays); Diana 
R.H. Winters, Intractable Delay and the Need to Amend the Petition Provisions of the 
FDCA, 90 IND. L.J. 1047, 1056–57 (2015) (describing efficiency measures taken within the 
9th Circuit).
365 Winters, supra note 27, at 254.
366 See supra note 15.
367 See supra notes 90–94.
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But in advice referral cases, the resulting delay is a problem. As Justice 
Marshall wrote regarding primary jurisdiction’s delay in his dissent in Ricci v. 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, one of the Supreme Court’s two advice referral 
cases:368
[I]nvocation of the doctrine derogates from the principle that except in 
extraordinary situations, every citizen is entitled to call upon the judiciary for 
expeditious vindication of his legal claims of right. . . . And surely the right to 
a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” comprehends within it the right to be 
heard without unreasonable delay.369
The harms inherent in delay are even more acute in the context of health 
and safety regulation.370 For example, the longer products with misleading or 
deceptive labels are on the shelves, the more harm results. Moreover, the role 
of judicial review in many of these cases is to fill gaps in the regulatory 
scheme, or to supplement the scarce resources of the relevant agency.371 In the 
context of food labeling, the preemption scheme was carefully drawn so as to 
leave room for state regulation, both by allowing state regulation that is 
identical to federal regulation (and thereby allowing litigants to seek state 
remedies for actions that violate state law) and by confining an express 
preemption clause to specific labeling actions, thereby leaving others open to 
state regulation.372 The benefit of preserving state consumer law protections is 
located not only in substantive law coverage, but also in judicial review. This 
benefit vanishes if issues—issues that Congress decided not to preempt 
through the FDCA—are removed from the judicial forum.
This interference with the regulatory scheme causes harm in two ways.
First, the beneficial effects of state regulation (including those realized through 
the tort system) are lost, and second, there is the potential for the interference 
with agency resource allocation and decisionmaking. State regulation can have 
                                                                                                                     
368 Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
369 Id. at 320 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 
377 (1971)).
370 See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“[D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable 
when human health and welfare are at stake . . . .”).
371 Winters, supra note 364, at 1048 (“The administrative state relies on private 
enforcement to remedy deficiencies in agency action . . . .”); see also Edward Rubin, It’s
Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 
101 (2003) (“All of [the Administrative Procedure Act’s] basic provisions rely on a single 
method for controlling the actions of administrative agencies, namely, participation by 
private parties.”).
372 For a detailed discussion of this scheme, see Winters, supra note 252, at 830–35. 
See generally Winters, supra note 27 (discussing the use of primary jurisdiction in food-
labeling litigation).
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a compensatory and a regulatory function,373 and financial liability can also 
serve to control behavior.374 A liability award in a common law suit “is 
designed to be[] a potent method of governing conduct and controlling 
policy.”375 Moreover, state law lawsuits can provide a forum where 
information about products, after they have been introduced to the market, can 
be developed, and products can be monitored.376 In advice referral primary 
jurisdiction cases, these benefits are delayed, if not lost.
Next, when a court refers an issue to an administrative agency, it asks the 
agency to prioritize that specific issue at that time. Agencies, however, are not 
structured to respond immediately to every issue of public concern.377 Agency 
discretion over resource allocation and prioritization are important interests, 
protected by their enabling statutes and administrative law deference 
doctrines.378 Consider the restriction on judicial interference in agency 
procedures required by the Supreme Court decision in Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.379 The Court 
held that “[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling 
circumstances the ‘administrative agencies “should be free to fashion their 
own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting 
them to discharge their multitudinous duties.”’”380 Judicial referral, while not 
violating this directive, operates within its reach.
For example, the FDA has explained its refusal to define the term 
“natural” by pleading a lack of resources and internal priority setting. In short, 
the agency chooses not to define the term at this time.381 Nevertheless, 
whether it is appropriate for courts to be referring this issue to the agency is 
                                                                                                                     
373 See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63–
64 (1966) (“[S]tate remedies have been designed to compensate the victim and enable him 
to vindicate his reputation.”).
374 Winters, supra note 252, at 859.
375 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (quoting San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
376 See Brief of Public Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, 
Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12-142) (“[S]tate 
law . . . provides incentives and a forum for the development of new information about 
drug safety . . . .”).
377 Agencies may have different conceptions of what matters need attention than does 
the public. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 19–20, 33 (1993).
378 See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2008).
379 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978). For an informative discussion of Vermont Yankee and its critics, see Walker, supra
note 16, at 1601–05.
380 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 
U.S. 279, 290 (1965)).
381 Letter from Leslie Kux, supra note 274.
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still an open question.382 If one thinks the agency can and should just ignore 
these missives, primary jurisdiction referrals become a futile exercise, causing 
pointless delay to the litigants. If the agency has to respond, however, even to 
say it will not respond, resources have been diverted.
And what about the benefits of uniformity and expertise? Regarding 
uniformity, the argument is that the specific question (usually of fact), which is 
“within the special competence of an administrative body,”383 should not be 
left to individual courts that may issue decisions conflicting with each other 
and the agency’s determination if and when it chooses to make one. In 
exclusive agency primary jurisdiction cases, the Supreme Court’s decisions 
have shown that the uniformity is paramount to the regulatory scheme, which 
would be fatally undermined if there were conflicting decisions.384 For 
example, conflicting decisions regarding the reasonableness of a railroad rate 
would undermine the anti-discriminatory purpose of the ICA.385
In the context of the advice referral, however, there are at least two 
reasons why this is not a convincing argument. First, uniformity can be 
fostered through the courts. If the cause of action arises under federal law, 
there is the ultimate possibility of Supreme Court review, in which place 
“uniformity in construction may be secured.”386 Of course, such review is rare, 
and many advice referral cases arise under state law. The consolidation of 
certain strains of cases in specific jurisdictions, like food-labeling cases in the 
Northern District of California, may lead to an informal uniformity, as courts 
take each other’s decisions into account and the cases percolate to courts of 
appeal.
Even if, however, such uniformity is not achieved, this potential messiness 
is a product of the pertinent regulatory scheme. Congress chose to allow a 
certain amount of state regulation, the maintenance of which respects the 
sovereignty and history of state authority and preserves the compensatory and 
regulatory functions of state law. The consequence of this may be 
heterogeneity. We see this compromise in certain regulatory arenas, like food 
                                                                                                                     
382 See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 759–61 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming the district court’s 2012 primary jurisdiction referral of the of the “natural”
question in the cosmetics context but remanding for the court to consider whether a stay 
would be more appropriate than a dismissal, and whether the referral should be 
reconsidered in light of intervening developments). See generally Winters, supra note 252
(discussing the question of whether referral to the FDA is appropriate in food-labeling 
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July 1, 2014).
383 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
384 See supra Part II.B.1.a–.b.
385 See supra Part II.B.1.a.
386 Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Super. Ct. of Del., 366 U.S. 656, 666 (1961) (quoting 
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922)).
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labeling. Ostensibly for a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme that 
fosters uniformity,387 gaps in the labeling scheme permit a certain amount of 
difference. We saw states, for example, experiment with requiring the labeling 
of genetically engineered ingredients, although this experimentation has 
recently been cut off by federal law.388 Although industry has argued that 
complying with varying regulations across the country will be difficult and 
costly, this has not resulted in federal regulation.389
Regarding expertise, in many cases courts are actually well-suited to 
resolve questions of fact, even if they are complex and technical. This is 
especially the case in the context of state law consumer protection issues.
While in primary jurisdiction cases “the expert and specialized knowledge of 
the agencies involved has been particularly stressed,”390 the mechanisms of 
lawsuits are designed so as to distill information from the expert to the fact
finder for determination.391 Unless the issue has been removed from judicial 
review by Congress, private law suits under state law are questions “courts are 
well-equipped to handle.”392 If the issue’s complexity is insurmountable, 
courts can request agency input by amicus brief if necessary.393
V. RESTORING PRIMARY JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court created the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to ensure 
the uniformity of rates in the context of common carriers.394 This uniformity 
was essential to the paramount purpose of the shipping statutes, which was to 
                                                                                                                     
387 Winters, supra note 252, at 827.
388 Vermont passed a law requiring the labeling of genetically modified ingredients, 
scheduled to take effect in 2016, but a federal labeling law preempts state law. See, e.g.,
Judge: Vermont’s GMO-Labeling Law and Industry Lawsuit Can Both Proceed, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/04/judge-vermonts-
plans-for-gmo-labeling-law-and-industry-lawsuit-can-both-proceed/#.VZNQWRNViko 
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Labeling Bill. Nobody’s Super Happy About It, NPR (July 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/s
ections/thesalt/2016/07/14/486060866/congress-just-passed-a-gmo-labeling-bill-nobodys-
super-happy-about-it [https://perma.cc/S7GG-QZR9].
389 See Lydia Wheeler, GMO Bill Intensifies Federal Food Fight, HILL (Mar. 28, 
2015), http://thehill.com/regulation/237268-gmo-bill-intensifies-federal-food-fight 
[https://perma.cc/8PDW-X6KL].
390 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
391 See, e.g., Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 
U.S. 676, 686 (1965) (stating that, even in the context of labor disputes, primary 
jurisdiction is not warranted: “[C]ourts are themselves not without experience in 
classifying bargaining subjects as terms or conditions of employment.”).
392 Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
393 See, e.g., Metrophones Telecomms., Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Telecomms., Inc., 423 
F.3d 1056, 1061, 1666–67 (9th Cir. 2005) (deferring to FCC’s interpretation of the statute 
put forward in an agency’s amicus brief).
394 For a more detailed history of the evolution of the Supreme Court’s primary 
jurisdiction doctrine, see supra Part II.B.1.
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eliminate discrimination. The Court found that allowing judicial review of the 
reasonableness of rates would destroy the statutes.395 Similarly, the federal 
scheme regulating industrial relations included not just substantive law, but an 
administrative agency designed to insure the uniformity of the application of 
the laws. Although primary jurisdiction took a slightly different form in the 
labor dispute context, the Court developed jurisprudence to negotiate the 
boundaries of the NLRB’s authority.396 And again, the Court found that 
allowing judicial review of areas within the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction 
would destroy the regulatory scheme.397 A large majority of the Court’s
primary jurisdiction cases have been in these two contexts over the last six or 
seven decades.398 And it is within these contexts that the doctrine should 
remain.
Would the benefits of eliminating the doctrine beyond rate-setting and 
labor dispute cases outweigh any harm caused? If the doctrine were to be 
bounded to rate-setting and labor dispute cases, parties in cases involving 
administrative law issues would no longer be subjected to uncertainty as to 
whether the court would refer the issue and the potential for long delay if it 
did. Regulated entities could operate under the assumption that they were
subject to review under state consumer protection laws. Notwithstanding the 
great variety of law and practice under these laws, this assumption can provide 
its own form of predictability. And the potential loss of uniformity is not as 
frightening a prospect as it may seem, as is discussed above.399 Moreover, the 
doctrine, a matter of judicial discretion, is applied haphazardly as it stands 
now,400 and this lack of consistency in its application undermines the 
doctrine’s purported benefits.
There are tools available for courts seeking to engage administrative 
agencies outside of the primary jurisdiction referral. In an article on the 
remand rule, Professor Christopher Walker developed a set of tools that courts 
can use to enhance court-agency dialogue to resolve complex administrative 
law disputes.401 These mechanisms enable courts to maintain supervision and 
a measure of authority over agency decisionmaking, even after the ordinary 
remand rule requires the court to send an erroneously-determined issue back to 
the agency to reconsider. Several of these tools may be useful to courts 
seeking to engage agencies in the determination of administrative law issues, 
but in contexts where a primary jurisdiction referral is inappropriate. For 
example, Walker suggests the “escalation of an issue within the Executive,”
by, for example, ordering supplemental briefing on a particular issue.402
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Because an agency may not be before the court in cases where primary 
jurisdiction referrals are considered, this may take the form here of requesting 
amicus briefs or agency input.403 Although an agency may simply refuse to 
participate, this itself provides the court an important signal.
Courts can also “escalate an issue within the executive” by “messages 
[they] send[] to the agency via [their] published opinions,”404 explains Walker.
This has recently happened: the FDA issued its recent call for input on the 
definition of the term “natural” based partly on the large number of cases 
asking for judicial resolution of the matter under state law.405 While the FDA 
may not resolve the matter expeditiously, this is still an indication that activity 
in the courts can spark agency action.
Should primary jurisdiction be available in cases such as those involving 
Medicaid, discussed above, that fall roughly into the same category as the rate-
setting cases—cases that depend on the adjudication of an administrative 
agency for a judicial determination? The use of primary jurisdiction in cases 
like these should be expressly bound to their context and analogized to the 
rate-setting primary jurisdiction precedent. Decisions relying on primary 
jurisdiction rarely articulate why the use of the doctrine is appropriate in the 
particular circumstance, and such an articulation could help to prevent doctrine 
spillover.
If a court does refer an issue to an agency under the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine, it should at the very least take steps to reduce delay and minimize the 
potential that the issue, and therefore the case, disappears down an 
administrative black hole. Cases should be stayed, not dismissed, and the court 
should provide a limited timeframe for the parties to approach the relevant 
agency. This would minimize delay and uncertainty, and ensure the parties 
have access to judicial review in the event that the agency does not respond to 
the inquiry. As Christopher Walker writes about the retention of jurisdiction in 
remand cases, “the panel jurisdiction retention tool facilitates court-agency 
dialogue by signaling to the agency that the court is interested in the outcome
on remand and that the panel itself is particularly interested in continuing the 
dialogue.”406 This applies to primary jurisdiction referrals as well. Limited 
timeframes also indicate a strong interest in the resolution of the issue and 
                                                                                                                     
403 The unavailability of primary jurisdiction 
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strong interest of the court in determining any remaining issues post 
referral.407 In cases where a court has been asked to consider an issue that is 
currently before an administrative agency, with a defined period in which an 
agency determination will be made, a stay pending administrative decision 
may be in order. These situations will be rare, however.408
VI. CONCLUSION
Primary jurisdiction has served an important function over the last century.
With it, courts can maintain jurisdiction over a case while referring an 
administrative law issue to the relevant agency, when the governing regulatory 
scheme requires that referral. Here, primary jurisdiction supports 
congressional purpose and allows courts and agencies to work together to 
achieve the same goal. Courts have also used the doctrine to refer issues to 
agencies when they seek the agencies’ advice, however, and this use of 
primary jurisdiction delays the resolution of cases, eliminates the benefits of 
judicial review, and harms the regulatory scheme. Courts should clearly 
articulate the reasons for and benefits of the doctrine’s use when it is applied 
in the former context, and should stop using primary jurisdiction in the advice 
referral manifestation.
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